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FARMERS, MIDDLEMEN, AND THE NEW 
RULE OF LAW MOVEMENT 
Brian JM Quinn* 
Anh T.T. Vu** 
Abstract: This paper investigates the economic relationships between 
farmers and middlemen in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta and places it in the 
context of the new rule of law movement. The new rule of law movement, 
which has grown in the wake of the collapse of formerly centrally planned 
economies, argues that the rule of law is a prerequisite for economic 
growth and that transition economies can only succeed by adopting 
strong formal legal rights and institutions. Notwithstanding more than 
two decades of an aggressive rule of law reform program, Vietnam’s for-
mal legal system remains weak. Using survey data from a sample of fruit 
farmers and middlemen we find that participants in the farm-gate market 
for pomelos carry out relatively complex transactions by granting buyers 
credit with little explicit reliance on formal legal structures. The devel-
opment of complex markets for fruit in the Mekong Delta in the absence 
of strong legal rights provides lessons for proponents of the new rule of 
law movement. First, in the absence of formal structures, private parties 
find ways of structuring transactions in order to assure contract perform-
ance. Second, development of formal legal structures is a very long term 
proposition with uncertain results. And finally, the experience of farmers 
and middlemen suggests that formal law and the development of formal 
legal institutions appear to trail economic development and should not 
therefore be considered an essential component of short-term economic 
reform efforts. 
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Introduction† 
 This paper is a reflection on recent field research investigating the 
economic relationships between farmers and middlemen in Vietnam’s 
Mekong Delta. Based on our study we find that participants in the 
farm-gate market for pomelos carry out relatively complex transactions 
by granting buyers credit with little explicit reliance on formal legal 
structures.1 We also find that farmers do not yet rely to a large degree 
on reputation or extensive relationships. Instead, farmers appear to 
rely on a portfolio approach in their sales to generate information 
about new buyers.2 As new buyers prove themselves reliable partners 
farmers shift more business to them. Further, as parties search for and 
find more reliable partners, the structure of this market appears to be 
migrating over time towards more relational contracting to support 
complex transactions. This snapshot of the fruit markets of the Mekong 
Delta suggests that first, notwithstanding the lack strong legal rights, 
parties are able to engage in complex transactions, and second, that 
developing formal legal structures is a complicated and long-term 
process with uncertain results. 
 Given the continuing debate over the importance of the formal 
legal system in creating conditions conducive to economic develop-
ment, these conclusions are significant. Throughout the 1990s and until 
now, general components of the World Bank’s prescription for develop-
ing and post-Soviet transition economies (the “Washington Consensus”) 
include market liberalization and strengthening of the rule of law to 
support the development of markets.3 Critics of the Washington Con-
sensus approach to rule of law reforms criticize its focus on formal legal 
                                                                                                                      
† Unless specified to the contrary, all references to Vietnamese law can be accessed at 
http://vbqppl.moj.gov.vn/pages/vbpq.aspx. In addition, the authors provided all transla-
tions of Vietnamese, unless otherwise stated. 
1 Pomelos are a grapefruit-like fruit common in South East Asia. See Lynne Char Ben-
nett, Pomelos Offer Big Burst of Sweet Citrus Flavor, S.F. Chron., Feb. 14, 2010, at K3. 
2See Brian JM Quinn & Anh T.T. Vu, Survey of Forty-Seven Specialized Pomelo Mid-
dlemen and One-Hundred-Eighty Pomelo Farmers in Three Mekong Delta Districts Spe-
cializing in the Pomelo Trade (2005–06) (unpublished raw data) (on file with authors). 
3See World Bank, From Plan to Market: World Development Report 1996, at 9, 
12, 22 (1996), available at http://go.worldbank.org/XNB7977XR0 (follow “From Plan to 
Market” hyperlink; then follow “PDF” hyperlink); see also Legal Vice Presidency, World 
Bank, Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform 3 (2004), available at http://go.worldba 
nk.org/JEKV2Q1ZK0 (follow “Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform 2004” hyperlink; 
then follow “PDF” hyperlink) (providing a comprehensive review of the World Bank’s ac-
tivities in legal and judicial reform); John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Re-
form, in Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? 7, 7–8 ( John William-
son ed., 1990) (laying out the “Washington Consensus”). 
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institutions in the form of legal transplantation and legal education as 
ineffective and a throw-back to the failed law and development move-
ment of the 1960s and 1970s.4 To the extent there is controversy, it is a 
tension between the academy, once burned, and development institu-
tions busily engaging in projects and lending activity.5 
 This Article does not intend to resolve the debate over the efficacy 
of this “new” rule of law movement. Rather, it calls into question 
whether the strong legal rights engendered in the formal legal institu-
tions favored by its activist approach are a prerequisite for economic 
growth and whether projects intended to improve the rule of law should 
be a high priority reform item in the short term. Indeed the experience 
of farmers and middlemen in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta, far removed 
from the influence of legal reform projects and formal rule of law activi-
ties, suggests the creation of strong legal rights of the type endorsed by 
the new rule of law movement are a “trailing edge” reform rather than a 
“leading edge” reform.6 Thus, notwithstanding a perceived demand for 
                                                                                                                      
4 See William Easterly, Institutions: Top Down or Bottom Up?, 98 Am. Econ. Rev., May 
2008, 95, 95–99 (arguing that top down institutional reforms are hopelessly naïve). See 
generally Curtis J. Milhaupt & Katharina Pistor, Law and Capitalism 27–44 (2008) 
(analyzing how the relationship between the legal system and the economic system relates 
to corporate governance); Lan Cao, Culture Change, 47 Va. J. Int’l L. 357 (2007) (arguing 
that culture, and not law, is the central determinant for economic growth); Dani Rodrik, 
Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s Eco-
nomic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform, 44 J. Econ. Lit. 973 (2006) (lik-
ening the Washington Consensus to the failed law and development movement of the 
1960s and 1970s); Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Use of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Eco-
nomic Development, in The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal 
253, 253–300 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (noting the lack of consistency 
among various groups working on “rule of law” projects); David M. Trubek & Alvaro San-
tos, Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development Theory and the Emergence of a New 
Critical Practice, to The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal, 
supra, at 1, 1–18 (arguing for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between 
law and development); David M. Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past, 
Present, and Future, in The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Ap-
praisal, supra, at 74, 74–94 (tracing the origins of the rule of law and identifying contra-
dictions that have emerged); Brent T. White, Rotten to the Core: Project Capture and the Failure 
of Judicial Reform in Mongolia, 4 E. Asia L. Rev. 209 (2009) (criticizing rule of law efforts in 
Mongolia). 
5 This tension is evident in the contributions of authors to the Northwestern Univer-
sity Law Review Colloquy’s symposium on the future of the law and development move-
ment. See generally Symposium, The Future of Law and Development, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. Col-
loquy 164 (2009) (discussing from multiple authors’ perspectives three main issues: 
whether “Law and Development” is really a field, what scholars have learned from this 
topic, and where attention should turn in the future). 
6 See generally Thomas C. Heller, An Immodest Postscript, in Beyond Common Knowl-
edge: Emprical Approaches to the Rule of Law 382, 382–95 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas 
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action, such measures should not be a high profile short term reform 
item.7 
 The new rule of law movement prescription starts from the as-
sumption that strong legal rights are fundamental to a functioning 
market economy.8 The theoretical basis for the movement—that where 
legal rights are strong, parties can engage in anonymous market trans-
actions with assurance that private contractual promises are backed by a 
reasonably efficient public enforcement regime—is attractive.9 Strong 
public enforcement institutions (that is, the “rule of law”) can provide a 
backdrop against which parties feel confident in engaging in transac-
tions with strangers often with many terms still left undefined.10 Conse-
quently, a system of strong legal rights working in the background can 
generate high levels of “generalized trust” even among strangers and 
translate into a greater willingness of economic actors to make long-
term investments and engage in complex transactions, thus facilitating 
economic development.11 
 The new rule of law movement found a home in the context of 
post-Soviet transition economies.12 Following the shift to markets, for-
mal legal structures designed to support central planning systems found 
themselves hopelessly obsolete.13 Because of this obsolescence, general-
ized trust suffered as formal structures and institutions were unable to 
keep up with changes on the ground.14 This economic transition pro-
                                                                                                                      
C. Heller eds., 2003) (discussing the new rule of law and the possible extensions of its con-
cepts to future reform programs). 
7 Thanks to Thomas Heller of Stanford for this conceptualization of law as a “trailing 
edge” issue in the development process. 
8 See Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in 
the West and Fails Everywhere Else 50 (2003). Hernando de Soto is an eloquent pro-
ponent of the view that strong formal property rights are necessary for economic growth. 
He is, however, not the only proponent. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The 
Property Right Paradigm, 33 J. Econ. Hist. 16, 16 (1973) (“Capitalism relies heavily on mar-
kets and private property rights to resolve conflicts over the use of scarce resources.”). 
9 See de Soto, supra note 8, at 54−55. Examples of such legal rights include property 
and contract rights. See id. 
10But see Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
Am. Soc. Rev. 55, 63−65 (1963) (studying informal contracting practices among businesses 
in the United States). 
11 See Steven N. Durlauf & Marcel Fafchamps, Social Capital, in Handbook of Eco-
nomic Growth 1639, 1646 (Philippe Aghion & Steven N. Durlauf eds., 2005) (defining 
“generalized trust”). 
12 See Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve 165 
(1999) (describing the rising importance of rule of law programs in the aftermath of the 
collapse of centrally-planned markets in Eastern Europe). 
13 See id. at 173–74. 
14 See id. 
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vided an urgent impetus to rule of law activities that was missing during 
the height of the law and development movement.15 Such activities in 
transition countries included a host of top-down efforts to re-write legis-
lation, as well efforts to reorient and train the judiciary not unlike many 
of the efforts of the law and development movement of the past.16 
 Vietnam is one such country in the midst of economic transition 
from central planning. Early on in its reform process, Vietnam em-
barked on an ambitious effort to remake its formal legal structures 
from the top-down to support the development of the new market 
economy.17 Though this effort has been aggressive in many respects, it 
has fallen short of a complete remake of Vietnam’s legal system and 
institutions.18 Consequently, the country still has relatively weak formal 
legal institutions and confidence in its formal institutions remains low. 
Vietnam has enjoyed significant economic growth over the past two 
decades in the face of these challenges.19 The development of informal 
institutions in support of complex commercial relationships has played 
an important role in that success.20 
 Economists John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff investigated 
informal structures supporting economic exchange amongst Vietnam-
ese manufacturers in the mid-1990s through a series of surveys and in-
terviews.21 This Article builds on their work and demonstrates that 
more than a decade later, and more than two decades since Vietnam 
initiated its economic and legal reform efforts, the task of creating 
                                                                                                                      
15 See id. at 182. 
16See Legal Vice Presidency, supra note 3, at 33–34; Brian JM Quinn, Vietnam’s Con-
tinuing Legal Reform: Gaining Control Over the Courts, 4 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol’y. J. 431, 435–36 
(2003). 
17 See Quinn, supra note 16, at 435–36. 
18 See id. at 442. 
19 See id. at 882. 
20 See Edmund J. Malesky & Markus Taussig, Where Is Credit Due? Legal Institutions, Con-
nections, and the Efficiency of Bank Lending in Vietnam, 25 J.L. Econ. & Org. 535, 538 (2009). 
Complex transactions are transactions where performance occurs over time. Conse-
quently, the second moving party in a complex transaction has an incentive, absent legal 
constraints or other informal constraining devices, to act opportunistically against the first 
moving party. 
21 See generally John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Dispute Prevention Without 
Courts in Vietnam, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 637 (1999) [hereinafter McMillan & Woodruff, 
Dispute Prevention] (relying on a 1995–1997 survey of privately owned manufacturing firms 
in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City); John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order 
Under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2421 (2000) [hereinafter McMillan & 
Woodruff, Private Order] (reviewing anecdotal descriptions of private-order practices in 
various countries and analyzing surveys of entrepreneurs from Vietnam, Russia, Ukraine, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Poland). 
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strong legal rights and robust formal legal institutions is not a simple 
technical challenge.22 Informal legal institutions and private ordering, 
or “personalized trust,” dominate the economic lives of market partici-
pants in Vietnam despite the country’s aggressive reform agenda.23 In 
that sense, nearly a quarter century of top-down rebuilding of formal 
legal structures has yet to take effective hold. 
 Similarly, our survey data from the market for pomelos in the Me-
kong Delta suggests that rather than conduct commerce in the shadow 
of formal legal institutions farmers engage in transactions with mid-
dlemen backed entirely by personalized trust. Although the majority of 
pomelo transactions are still carried out on the spot market, in about a 
third of sales, farmers structure complex transactions by the extending 
trade credit to middlemen. This credit is sometimes, but not always, 
backed by extensive relationships. In any event, farmers do not rely on 
formal legal structures to assure contract performance. In other words, 
farmers in the Mekong Delta contract with middlemen in the absence 
of the formal law and legal institutions, rather than in its shadow.24 
 To the extent the new rule of law movement focuses on develop-
ing formal legal structures from the top-down, the movement threatens 
to repeat the mistakes of the law and development movement of the 
1960s and 1970s.25 The development of complex markets for fruit in 
the Mekong Delta is backed by a bottom-up private ordering process 
and not by any changes in formal legal structures. In fact, market par-
ticipants appear to treat such structures as irrelevant for the most part. 
They rely neither on formal contracting nor on formal dispute mecha-
nisms in their commercial dealings. Therefore, this Article suggests that 
by treating the development of legal institutions as a mere top-down 
technical problem that can generate the generalized trust required in a 
market economy, the new rule of law movement may repeat the mis-
takes of the past and ultimately fail to be of consequence. 
 Part I provides a brief overview of the new rule of law movement. 
Part II describes Vietnam’s reform efforts in the past several decades, 
                                                                                                                      
22 See Milhaupt & Pistor, supra note 4, at 4–8 (challenging the view that legal reform 
is a simple technical exercise). 
23 See generally Durlauf & Fafchamps, supra note 11, at 1646–47 (explaining that per-
sonalized trust, which arises from repeated interpersonal interaction takes time and effort 
to establish but does not always yield the most efficient outcome). 
24 When farmers are contracting in the absence of formal legal institutions, they are, 
in Rodrick’s terms, relying on “second-best institutions.” See Dani Rodrick, Second-Best Insti-
tutions 1– 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14050, 2008), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14050.pdf. 
25 See Trubeck & Santos, supra note 4, at 9. 
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focusing on relevant developments in reform of its legal system and 
introduces the work of McMillan and Woodruff, noting that their em-
pirical study and subsequent research confirm that public confidence 
in formal legal institutions remains low in Vietnam notwithstanding 
many years of active engagement by the central government and for-
eign donors in legal reform programs. Part III details the structure of 
the fruit markets of the Mekong Delta, presenting findings and analysis 
from our survey of 180 pomelo farmers and forty-seven middlemen. 
Part IV demonstrates that, during the decade between the work of 
McMillan and Woodruff and our study, top-down rule of law activities 
appear to have had little impact on the operation of complex market 
transactions in the Mekong Delta. This Article concludes that the crea-
tion and development of strong legal rights through formal institutions 
is likely a trailing edge issue with an uncertain effect on the quality of 
economic growth over time. Our conclusion implies that the urgency 
of the new rule of law movement may be misplaced. 
I. The New Rule of Law Movement 
 The role of law in facilitating economic growth in developing and 
transition economies is controversial among academics and policymak-
ers.26 On the one hand, legal academics have largely discredited the law 
                                                                                                                      
26 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, The Law-Growth Nexus: The Rule of Law and Eco-
nomic Development 273–77 (2006) (arguing that the origins of legal systems should not 
be determinative of economic development); Milhaupt & Pistor, supra note 4, at 5–8 
(arguing for a more complex and contextualized understanding of the relationship be-
tween law and development); Stephen Haggard et al., The Rule of Law and Economic Devel-
opment, 11 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 205, 281 (2008) (reviewing the empirical work on the rule 
of law and economic development and arguing that formal legal institutions may not be a 
prerequisite for growth); Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 
46 J. Econ. Lit. 285, 326 (2008) (concluding that the origin of legal systems are important 
in economic development); Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy, in Pro-
moting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge 75, 75–101 (Thomas Ca-
rothers ed., 2006) (arguing for a more contextualist understanding of the rule of law); see 
also Carothers, supra note 12, at 163–77 (discussing the challenges of aiding other coun-
tries with rule of law development); Randall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law: An Intro-
duction and Provisional Conclusion, in Asian Discourses of Rule of Law: Theories and 
Implementation of Rule of Law in Twelve Asian Countries, France and the U.S. 1, 
38–39 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004) (discussing the rule of law controversy as under-
stood in the context of economic reform and transition in Vietnam and China); Law Re-
form in Developing and Transitional States (Tim Lindsey ed., 2007) (arguing, in 
general, for a more contextualized approach to the rule of law debate); Trubek & Santos, 
supra note 4, at 3–14 (identifying and analyzing the role of law in economic development); 
Williamson, supra note 3 (laying out the “Washington Consensus” for the first time); Eco-
nomics and the Rule of Law: Order in the Jungle, Economist, Mar. 15, 2008, at 83–85 (discuss-
ing the contradictory research regarding rules of law). But see Rodrik, supra note 4, at 986 
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and development movement of the 1960s and 1970s.27 On the other 
hand, the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the transition of 
formerly centrally-planned economies to market economies along with 
interest by financial economists in the role of institutions has garnered 
new attention to the role of law.28 This development followed logically 
as the formal legal structures of formerly centrally-planned economies 
were wholly out of touch with the emerging market economies in 
which they existed.29 Rule of law projects have thus arisen all over the 
world as core components of international aid programs.30 By one es-
timate, since 1990 the World Bank alone has invested approximately 
$2.9 billion in rule of law technical assistance projects.31 Economic 
transition has provided a new generation of academics, particularly fi-
nancial economists, opportunities to infer linkages between formal le-
gal systems and economic development.32 
 This movement places law and the creation of formal legal struc-
tures at the very center of the effort to generate and support economic 
growth in transition and developing countries.33 The movement’s pro-
ponents reason that centrally-planned economies lacked appropriate 
legal and regulatory structures to support markets and that efficient 
markets and economic growth in transition economies require the rule 
                                                                                                                      
(discussing the aftermath of the Washington Consensus); Mathew D McCubbins, Daniel B. 
Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Rule of Law Unplugged (Univ. of Tex. Law, Pub. Law 
Research Paper No. 154, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1467797 (discussing 
the multidimensional and complex nature of rules of law). 
27 See John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, 
Decline and Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 Am. J. Comp. L. 457, 479–83 
(1977); David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on 
the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 4 Wis. L. Rev. 1062, 1080–89 
(1974). 
28 See Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance 89–91, 107–12 (1990); Trubek, supra note 4, at 81–85. 
29 See Trubek, supra note 4, at 80–85. Douglass North received a Nobel Prize for his 
work analyzing the role of institutions in setting the rules of the game for economies. See 
generally North, supra note 28. Rafael La Porta and his co-authors attribute the origin of 
legal systems to strength of legal rights and to economic success. See Rafael La Porta, Flor-
encio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of External 
Finance, 52 J. Fin. 1131, 1149–50 (1997). See generally World Bank, supra note 3, at 87–97 
(noting the importance of developing new formal legal institutions for transition econo-
mies). 
30 See Trubek, supra note 4, at 82–86; see also Carothers, supra note 12, at 331–43 (de-
scribing the aid programs, including rule of law programs, that have arisen as a result of 
the promotion of democracy). See generally Legal Vice Presidency, supra note 3 (provid-
ing a comprehensive review of the World Bank’s activities in legal and judicial reform). 
31 See Trubek, supra note 4, at 74. 
32 See Legal Vice Presidency, supra note 3, at 2; Trubek, supra note 4, at 82–86. 
33 See Trubek, supra note 4, at 81–86. 
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of law and formal legal structures, in particular the protection of prop-
erty rights and the efficient enforcement of contracts.34 Curtis J. Mil-
haupt and Katharina Pistor highlighted the importance of formal legal 
structures to this view when they summarized the movement’s rights-
based argument in the following way: “[L]aw fosters economic activity 
(exclusively) by protecting property rights. A legal system that clearly 
allocates and protects property rights (a rule of law) precedes eco-
nomic development and is a precondition to economic success. . . . The 
quality of property rights protections, in turn, determines economic 
outcomes.”35 
 In the context of transition economies, an assimilation of this 
point of view must be understood as a redefinition of the role of the 
state from that of participant to arbiter of the rules of the market-
place.36 Rule of law support efforts are intended to increase a general-
ized sense of trust amongst market participants so that in the event they 
must rely on formal legal institutions to ensure contract performance 
or to protect property rights, “courts [will] have the power and the ca-
pacity to judge objectively and [such] judgments [will be] enforced.”37 
In this way, the new rule of law movement embraces the state not as a 
market participant but more suitably as a market referee.38 
 International financial institutions adopted this line of reasoning 
during the 1990s.39 The World Bank, for example, funded over six 
hundred projects related to rule of law activities during the 1990s.40 Key 
elements of such programs have included assisting development of the 
legislative process, legislative drafting exercises (focused mostly on de-
veloping legal rules for the economic sphere), support for moderniz-
ing and training the judiciary, and support for increasing the inde-
pendence of judiciaries.41 These rule of law efforts espoused by the 
                                                                                                                      
34See Milhaupt & Pistor, supra note 4, at 4. 
35 See id. 
36 See Trubek, supra note 4, at 86–91. This differs from the general perspective on the 
role of law as an instrument of state policy that dominated the law and development move-
ment. See id. (discussing these differences). 
37 See World Bank, supra note 3, at 87. “The developing countries’ transition toward 
market economies necessitated strategies to encourage domestic and foreign private in-
vestment. This goal could not be reached without modifying or overhauling the legal and 
institutional framework and firmly establishing the rule of law to create the necessary cli-
mate of stability and predictability.” Legal Vice Presidency, supra note 3, at 2. 
38 See Trubek, supra note 4, at 91. 
39 See Legal Vice Presidency, supra note 3, at 3. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. at 3–4. In Cambodia, for instance, the World Bank funded efforts to assist the 
Cambodian government establish a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework for the 
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World Bank became an integral component of the “Washington Con-
sensus” and a central component of many countries’ transition and re-
form efforts.42 
 Milhaupt and Pistor note that such efforts tend to treat law and 
legal reform as a technical, rather than a political or social, challenge.43 
They are right to be skeptical. Were the law and legal reform no more 
than a technical problem, like the size of the money supply, it would be 
possible to make a number of readily obvious changes to key legal insti-
tutions and then see the effect in the economy.44 In fact, the law and 
development movement of the 1960s and 1970s focused its efforts on 
rebuilding developing country legal institutions along the lines of 
Western legal institutions with little success.45 The failure of that 
movement lends credence to skeptics of its tenets. 
 Nevertheless, in some respects, post-transition rule of law efforts— 
that is, the new rule of law movement—mimic many of the strategies of 
the failed law and development movement.46 Though the circum-
stances of transition make the impetus for rule of law efforts more ob-
vious, to a large extent the efforts simply revive the failed approaches of 
the law and development movement’s “legal liberalism.”47 To the extent 
this is true, it raises questions about the efforts’ ultimate utility. As pre-
viously noted, the law and development movement failed, in part, due 
to its heavy emphasis on the transplantation of formal legal institutions 
(particularly from the United States and Western Europe), legal struc-
                                                                                                                      
education sector. Id. at 26–27. In China, the World Bank financed efforts to assist the Chi-
nese legislature in drafting laws in the following areas: contracts, insurance, partnerships, 
futures market, bidding, sole enterprises, and trusts and estates. Id. at 28–29. Additionally, 
in Tanzania, the Bank sponsored efforts in the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Af-
fairs through four activities—capacity building, international study tours for ministry staff, 
consultative stakeholder workshops, and a public awareness campaign on the changes in 
the legal system. Id. at 24–25. In Kenya, the World Bank supported efforts to assist Kenya to 
create an independent judiciary. Id. at 20. 
42 Williamson, supra note 3, at 7–8. This consensus included a series of other policy 
and institutional reforms, protection of property rights among them, that if adopted were 
expected to lead to economic growth. See id. This view has been challenged by Rodrik 
among others. See Rodrik, supra note 4. 
43 Milhaupt & Pistor, supra note 4, at 20. 
44 See id. at 20–21. 
45 See Trubek, supra note 4, at 76–78. 
46 See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in the Fun House: A Reply to Professor 
Seidman, 1 Res. L. & Soc. 31, 32 (1978). 
47 See id. Trubek and Galanter characterized “legal liberalism” in 1974 as a belief “that 
establishment in the Third World of legal systems similar to those of the United States and 
Western Europe promoted development because they would foster equality, enhance par-
ticipation in public life, and lead to more effective mastery of the world.” Id. 
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tures, and legislation, and an inability to be culturally aware of the in-
formal institutions that form the backbone of many legal cultures.48 
Therefore, to the extent the new rule of law movement translates its 
understanding of the law’s role concretely in the form of project and 
programs, it threatens to devolve into the mere technical formalism of 
legislative drafting exercises, judicial training, and formal process 
thereby repeating many of the mistakes of the law and development 
movement.49 
 Consider the similarities between the new rule of law movement  
and the failed law and development movement of the 1970s. First, both 
start from an assumption that strong legal rights are a prerequisite to 
economic growth and development.50 Second, both include a focus on 
creating strong legal rights through a re-creation of aspects of U.S. and 
Western-styled formal legal institutions, including legislative drafting 
training of the judiciary and the bar, among other activities.51 This fo-
cus on formal institutions and formal structures is ultimately an over-
simplification of the Washington Consensus, but the translation of a 
nuanced understanding of the development of formal and informal 
legal institutions to an action plan is often vulnerable to dangerous 
simplifications. Such simplifications are sometimes necessary to trans-
late nuanced understandings of the interplay between institutions and 
development into projects and programs financed by bilateral and mul-
tilateral donors. These projects and programs are, however, then sus-
ceptible to a counting bias. They tend to be designed to facilitate the 
counting of outputs in the formal system rather than the deepening of 
informal institutions, hence the focus on legislative drafting and the 
training of judges and lawyers.52 
                                                                                                                      
48 See Trubek, supra note 4, at 78; Trubek & Galanter, supra note 27, at 1080. 
49 See Trubek, supra note 4, at 78–81; Trubek & Galanter, supra note 27, at 1080, 1082; 
see also Elliot M. Burg, Law and Development: A Review of the Literature and a Critique of “Schol-
ars in Self-Estrangement,” 25 Am. J. Comp. L. 492, 498–511, 518–25 (1977) (surveying schol-
arship and literature on law and development. 
50 See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 27, at 1079. 
51 See id. at 1080, 1082. Professor Brian Tamanaha describes modernization theory, a 
motivating force in the law and development movement, as a view that “development was 
an inevitable, evolutionary process . . . that would ultimately produce economic, political 
and social institutions similar to those in the West.” Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-
and-Development Studies, 89 Am. J. Int’l. L. 470, 471 (1995) (reviewing Law and Crisis in 
the Third World (Sammy Adelman & Abdul Paliwala eds., 1993) and 2 Law and Devel-
opment: Legal Cultures (Anthony Carty ed., 1992)). Although not explicitly adopting 
modernization theory, the new rule of law movement shares many of its attributes. See id. 
52 See Quinn, supra note 16, at 456−57. 
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 The world envisioned by rule of law advocates is one of high levels 
of generalized trust backed by protection of property rights by formal 
legal institutions permitting complex one-off transactions with strang-
ers. Nevertheless, such a world does not exist. Following the demise of 
the law and development movement, legal scholars and economists be-
gan to focus on the role of private ordering and informal institutions 
over formal legal institutions and formal structures in order to develop 
a more nuanced understanding of legal culture.53 Indeed, the defini-
tion of legal institutions, once narrow, has broadened to include these 
informal structures.54 However, deepening such structures through 
technical assistance projects and donor-funded programs specifically 
presents many of the same challenges of an earlier era. Their informal-
ity presents challenges to donors designing fundable projects. In fact, 
forming or reforming social networks and informal legal institutions is 
neither a simple nor a short-term task. 
                                                                                                                      
53 See, e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 6 (1984) (“The object 
of this enterprise is to develop a theory of cooperation that can be used to discover what is 
necessary for cooperation to emerge [so that] appropriate actions can be taken to foster 
the development of cooperation in a specific setting.”); Robert C. Ellickson, Order 
Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 1 (1994) (attempting to add more 
realism and clarity to the theory that “demarcate[s] the domain of human activity that falls 
within—and beyond—the shadow of the law”); Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy 
Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy 18185 (1993) (examining the effect of social 
context on institutions); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115, 138 (1992) (examining “reputa-
tion bonds,” which back a portion of commercial contracts); Marcel Fafchamps & Bart 
Minten, Returns to Social Network Capital Among Traders, 54 Oxford Econ. Papers 173, 174 
(2002) (discussing the means by which social capital affects economic efficiency); Eric A. 
Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and Norms of the World’s Premier Fish Market, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 
313, 314 (2006) (examining “whether, when, [and] why informal norms rather than state-
created law prevail in certain settings”); Edward L. Glaeser, David Laibson & Bruce Sacer-
dote, An Economic Approach to Social Capital, 112 Econ. J. F437, F438 (2002) (discussing and 
explaining individual and social capital); Edward L. Glaeser, The Formation of Social Capital, 
in 15 The Contribution of Human and Social Capital to Sustained Economic 
Growth and Well-Being: International Symposium Report 381, 38384 ( John F. Hel-
liwell ed., 2001) (examining the differences between individual and community based 
capital); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institu-
tional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. Legal Stud. 349, 34951 (1981) (discussing that law 
and institutions are central to the economics of property rights but that the practices of 
“traders in ‘traditional’ markets suggest[] that traders personalize or particularize exchange 
relations”); Macauley, supra note 10, at 5557 (analyzing contextual relations in commercial 
exchanges); McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 21, at 644 (explaining 
that Vietnamese private business owners have established their own “ad hoc strategy for 
economic development”); McMillan & Woodruff, Private Order, supra note 21, at 2421 22 
(discussing the formation and roles of private order organizations). 
54 See Macauley, supra note 10, at 55−57. 
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 One general conclusion of the recent scholarship in this area is 
that strong social networks and informal institutions can create oppor-
tunities for repeated interactions and thereby facilitate economic activ-
ity in the absence of formal legal structures.55 This is because extensive 
relationships and relational contracting can provide important mecha-
nisms for transmission of information about markets, reputations of 
market actors as well as the development of social norms.56 In countries 
where legal rights are weak, trust generated by social norms and rela-
tional contracting can be highly personalized.57 Participation in social 
networks facilitates the development of such trust and social capital be-
cause it provides opportunities for parties to develop extensive relation-
ships with potential counterparties and to exchange information about 
other market actors.58 Thus, personalized trust and social capital can be 
important in promoting economic activity in the absence of formal le-
gal institutions.59 
 In the language of private ordering, trust is an inherently calcula-
tive process.60 Before one decides to commit to a transaction and leave 
herself vulnerable to opportunism, she must make a calculation— ex-
plicit or implicit—about the likelihood of the counter-party in the 
transaction to make good on his commitments.61 Where legal rights are 
weak, parties may hesitate to make long-term investments or engage in 
transactions with strangers lest they be unable to adjudicate their rights 
in the event of default.62 In such circumstances, high levels of personal-
                                                                                                                      
55 See Putnam, supra note 53, at 176; Glaeser, Laibson & Sacerdote, supra note 53, at 
F437–38. 
56 See Durlauf & Fafchamps, supra note 11, at 1645, 1653–56. 
57 See Landa, supra note 53, at 350–51. 
58 See id. at 357–61. 
59 See Durlauf & Fafchamps, supra note 11, at 1646. 
60 See Russell Hardin, Trust & Trustworthiness 3–7 (2002). Hardin refers to trust 
as an encapsulated interest; one trusts because the counter party’s interest encapsulates 
your interest. See id. at 3. Trust can be defined as “[a]n action that . . . creates the possibil-
ity of mutual benefit, if the other person is cooperative, and the risk of loss to oneself if the 
other person defects.” James C. Cox, How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity, 46 Games & Econ. 
Behav. 260, 263 (2004); see also Hardin, supra at 11–12 (discussing that trust involves not 
only an expectation that someone will act for your benefit, but also relevant motivation 
that the person will act in that way, as well as a certain risk). 
61 See Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. & 
Econ. 453, 463–65 (1993). Other authors, while not as explicit in their support of this 
economic view of trust, nevertheless embed concepts of an implicit calculation in their 
descriptions of trust. See Hardin, supra note 60, at 3–7. 
62 See Landa, supra note 53, at 358–60. 
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ized trust can be critical to successful contracting.63 Groups, social, and 
trading networks can facilitate complex transactions by enlarging the 
shadow of the future.64 In other words, as a trading pair’s time horizon 
expands through networks that give rise to relational contracting, one 
can raise the expected value of continuing the relationships as well as 
the cost of a counter-party’s defection.65 The higher those costs, the 
higher the level of personal trust.66 
 Extensive social and trading networks can also permit interactions 
with strangers by creating avenues for the development of reputation 
mechanisms.67 Reputation can be an important device for generating 
personalized trust.68 Parties with good reputations, who can credibly 
signal their value as a business partner, may find it easier to engage with 
strangers in complex transactions.69 The existence of a reputation also 
extends the time horizon by permitting strangers engaged in one-off 
transactions to affect the future business prospects of a party who de-
faults on contractual commitments.70 In a business segment where 
reputation is important, new entrants may make investments that gen-
erate positive reputations in order to stimulate business opportunities.71 
                                                                                                                      
63 See Durlauf & Fafchamps, supra note 11, at 1648–49. The development of personalized 
trust in developing countries through the use of relational contracting and reputation 
mechanism has been studied by, among others, Landa and Fafchamps. See Marcel Fafchamps, 
The Enforcement of Commercial Contracts in Ghana, 24 World Dev. 427 (1996); Landa, supra 
note 53. 
64 See Axelrod, supra note 53, at 124, 126–32 (arguing that “enlarging the shadow of 
the future” is among the strongest incentives to promote cooperation and self-enforce-
ment of commitments). Dixit notes in his review of the literature that as the probability of 
meeting in the future rises so do the costs of defection. See Avinash K. Dixit, Lawless-
ness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance 67–76 (2004). Bernstein and 
Landa both describe how social networks are the locus of the development of personalized 
trust and enlarge the shadow of the future and undergird economic activity. See Bernstein, 
supra note 53, at 119–24; Landa, supra note 53, at 350. 
65 See Axelrod, supra note 53, at 124, 126–32. 
66 See id. 
67 See Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons 
from Medieval Trade, app. c at 428–30 (2006) (examining the relationship between 
reputation and social networks among medieval traders). 
68 See Adam Smith, Lecture on the Influence of Commerce on Manners (1776), reprinted in 
Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct 17, 17 (Daniel 
B. Klein ed., 2000) (noting the importance of reputation in the conduct of business). 
69 See Bernstein, supra note 53, at 119–24. 
70 See Paul Resnick & Richard Zeckhauser, Trust Among Strangers in Internet Transactions: 
Empirical Analysis of eBay’s Reputation System, in The Economics of the Internet and E-
Commerce 127, 142–44 (Michael R. Baye ed., 2002) (examining the development and use 
of reputation among strangers on the eBay auction markets). 
71 See Bernstein, supra note 53, at 140–42 (describing how ethnic and cultural ties 
dominate reputation markets in New York’s diamond industry); Landa, supra note 53, at 
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 The key lesson of the work examining social networks is that 
strong formal legal rights and institutions may not be a prerequisite for 
sustained economic growth. If that is the case, then new rule of law ef-
forts motivated by the perceived need to provide nascent market 
economies with formal protection of property rights and contract en-
forcement may be misplaced. At the very least, to the extent more sub-
tle and complex understandings of the rule of law and its relationship 
to economic growth are lost in the translation to technical assistance 
projects and activities, the new rule of law movement risks suffering the 
irrelevance of the law and development movement. This is particularly 
true as the object of attention—social networks and informal institu-
tions—are almost by definition impossible to quantify in a way that mo-
tivates the funding agencies at the center of the new rule of law. The 
experience of Vietnam with reform of its economy and legal system 
provide an important point of reference for the new rule of law move-
ment with respect to how market participants rely on social networks 
and relational contracting in the absence of strong formal legal institu-
tions. Indeed, following nearly a quarter century of legal reform, the 
present provides an opportune moment to take stock of the new rule of 
law developments in Vietnam. 
II. Vietnam in Transition 
 Vietnam began its transition from central planning to a market 
economy in the mid-1980s.72 The Doi Moi, or Renovation, era has been 
characterized by increasing liberalization of the economic arena.73 By 
1989, for example, Vietnam had substantially freed up agricultural 
production by almost completely privatizing the agricultural sector.74 
This was followed by across the board price liberalizations, devaluation 
of the exchange rate, and a reduction in subsidies to state enterprises.75 
As a result of successful implementation of the reform program, Viet-
                                                                                                                      
355–57 (describing how family and ethnic ties can facilitate the transmission of informa-
tion about reputation). 
72 See Dao Xuan Sam, New Steps in the Change to the Market Economy (1979–2007), in 
Renovation in Vietnam: Recollection and Contemplation 23, 25 (Dao Xuan Sam et 
al. eds., Dang The Truyen et al. trans., 2008). 
73 See id. at 51 (discussing the beginnings of the Doi Moi era). 
74 See Gabrielle Lipworth & Erich Spitäller, Viet Nam—Reform and Stabilization, 1986–92, 
at 7 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/93/46, 1993). 
75 See Le Dang Doanh et al., Explaining Growth in Vietnam 16 ( June 2002) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the Central Institute for Economic Management in Hanoi, 
Vietnam); D.M. Leipziger, Awakening the Market: Viet Nam’s Economic Transition 6 (World 
Bank, Discussion Paper No. 157, 1992). 
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nam enjoyed a period of rapid growth averaging between eight to nine 
percent per year over the past two decades.76 
 Agriculture has been one of the most important beneficiaries of 
Vietnam’s economic reform program and is an important part of the 
country’s economic life.77 The economic liberalization of the late 1980s 
helped spur a massive expansion in rice output, allowing Vietnam to 
move from a net rice importer in 1988 to the world’s third largest rice 
exporter in 1989.78 During the 1990s with the growth in the production 
of coffee, Vietnam became the second largest coffee exporter in the 
world, behind only Brazil.79 Notwithstanding the success of its agricul-
tural sector, just over twenty percent of the country’s gross domestic 
product is generated by the agricultural sector.80 Overall, Vietnam re-
mains a mostly poor, rural country with more than seventy-three per-
cent of its population residing in rural areas.81 
 Formal institutions and legal structures designed for a centrally 
planned economy are generally inappropriate for a post-transition 
economy where markets, and not the central plan, dictate allocation of 
capital and investment decisions. Indeed, in the context of central 
planning, formal legal institutions were not appropriate avenues for 
commercial or economic disputes. Under that rubric, when actual pro-
duction of goods or services deviated from the plan, parties had their 
disagreements resolved by higher authorities or the planning ministry 
rather than courts or the formal legal system.82 Instead, the primary 
function of the formal legal system in centrally planned regimes was to 
manage criminal law issues on behalf of the state, not to protect private 
property rights or assure the performance of private parties in con-
tract.83 
 Consequently, when Vietnam undertook a transition to a market 
economy in 1986, its formal legal institutions were wholly discordant 
                                                                                                                      
76 See David O. Dapice, Overview of Vietnam’s Economy After the Crisis 1 ( June 2000) 
(working paper, on file with the Kennedy School of Government); see also National Accounts 
and State Budget, 2008 Stat. Y.B. Vietnam (Gen. Stat. Office of Vietnam) 71 (listing the 
growth rates of the GDP). 
77 See Dao Xuan Sam, supra note 72, at 25–26. 
78 See Leipziger, supra note 75, at 6. 
79 See Antony Wild, Coffee: A Dark History 6, 285 (2004). 
80 National Accounts and State Budget, supra note 76, at 72. 
81 See United Nations, Vietnam: Key Development Challenges, http://www.un.org.vn 
(follow “Site Map” hyperlink; then follow “Key Development Challenges” hyperlink) (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
82 See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 21, at 640–41; McMillan & 
Woodruff, Private Order, supra note 21, at 2443. 
83 See McMillan & Woodruff, Private Order, supra note 21, at 2421. 
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with the requirements of the market.84  The backwardness of its formal 
structures can account for the frenetic pace at which the country’s leg-
islature has passed a host of legislation over the past two decades. In 
fact, since the reform effort began in 1986, the National Assembly of 
Vietnam has passed 216 laws and codes (luat and bo luat).85 This is a vast 
increase in legislative productivity compared to the twenty-seven laws 
and codes passed by the National Assembly during the entire thirty-
three year period from 1953 to 1986.86 
 Much of this legislation passed by the National Assembly has 
aimed at modernizing the country’s regulation of its economic sphere 
in support of Vietnam’s effort to build a legal state (“xay dung nha nuoc 
phap quyen”).87 For example, the first important piece of legislation fol-
lowing the beginning of the reform agenda was the 1987 Foreign Di-
rect Investment Law.88 This law created a legal framework to provide 
foreign investors some degree of legal certainty and transparency in an 
effort to stimulate direct investment in Vietnam. By 1990, the company 
and private enterprise laws permitted domestic investors to incorporate 
private enterprises subject to certain constraints.89 A series of laws fo-
cused on reorganizing the structure of the state and the judiciary fol-
lowed in 1992.90 Five of the eight laws passed by the National Assembly 
that year dealt with the structure and function of formal legal institu-
tions, including the People’s Courts, the State Procuracy, the Govern-
ment, the National Assembly and elections.91 Land and property rights 
                                                                                                                      
84 See Pham Chi Lan, Development for the Legal Environment in Vietnam- Memorable Paths, 
supra note 72, at 181–83. 
85 See Ministry of Justice of Vietnam, Legal Documents, http://vbqppl.moj.gov.vn/ 
Pages/vbpq.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (containing a comprehensive list of codes, laws 
and other legal documents). 
86 See id. Between 2002 and 2006, the legislature was particularly active, passing more 
than 100 of the 216 laws and codes passed since 1953. Id. 
87 See Truong Hoa Binh, Reforming the Courts, Vietnam L. & Legal F., May 2009, at 4 
(discussing the important role of the courts in creating a legal state). 
88 See LUẬT THUẾ XUẤT KHẨU, THUẾ NHẬP KHẨU [Law on the Export Tax and 
the Import Tax] Số: Không số [No Number] (1987) (Vietnam). 
89 See LUẬT DOANH NGHIỆP TƯ NHÂN [Law on Enterprise] Số: Không số [No 
Number] (1990) (Vietnam); LUẬT CÔNG TY [Law on the Company] Số: Không số [No 
Number] (1990) (Vietnam). The Private Enterprise Law of 1990 and the Company Law of 
1990 were amended and replaced in whole by the 1999 Enterprise Law. Nguyen Thi Anh 
Van, An Overview of Vietnam Enterprise Law, 190 Nagoya J.L. & Pol. 1, 4 (2001). 
90 See Truong Hoa Binh, supra note 87, at 4. 
91 See LUẬT TỔ CHỨC VIỆN KIỂM SÁT NHÂN DÂN [Law on the Organization of the 
People's Procuracy] Số: Không số [No Number] (1992) (Vietnam); LUẬT TỔ CHỨC TOÀ 
ÁN NHÂN DÂN [Law on the Organization of the Peoples’ Court] Số: Không số [No Num-
ber] (1992) (Vietnam); LUẬT TỔ CHỨC CHÍNH PHỦ NƯỚC CỘNG HOÀ XÃ HỘI CHỦ 
NGHĨA VIỆT NAM [Law on the Organization of the Government of the Socialist Republic 
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were the subject of legislative attention in 1993 and 1994.92 Further, the 
National Assembly adopted the Civil Code in 1995 to address contract 
and economic relations among private parties.93 In sum, the focus of 
most of this legislative activity was to adapt existing regulatory struc-
tures to the changes in the real economy in an effort to build a “legal 
state” in Vietnam.94 
 Although Vietnam’s initial steps towards reforming its formal legal 
structures were internally generated, international donors have also 
sponsored a series of rule of law initiatives in the country.95 The United 
States, for example, has actively supported rule of law activities in Viet-
nam. Implementation of the bilateral trade agreement between the 
United States and Vietnam has required and spurred an increase in 
legislative activity in Vietnam.96 In furtherance of these efforts, the 
United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”) has 
sponsored a series of initiatives to “improve the rule of law in Vietnam, 
as mandated by the WTO and other international commitments.”97 
USAID has undertaken efforts with respect to legislative drafting and 
                                                                                                                      
of Vietnam] Số: Không số [No Number] (1992) (Vietnam); LUẬT TỔ CHỨC QUỐC HỘI 
[Law on the Organization of the National Assembly] Số: Không số [No Number] (1992) 
(Vietnam); LUẬT BẦU CỬ ĐẠI BIỂU QUỐC HỘI [Law on the Election of Deputies of 
the National Assembly] Số: Không số [No Number] (1992) (Vietnam). 
92 LUẬT THUẾ CHUYỂN QUYỀN SỬ DỤNG ĐẤT [Rental and Land Transfer Law] 
Số: Không số [No Number] (1994) (Vietnam); LUẬT ĐẤTĐAI [Land Law] Số: Không số 
[No Number] (1993) (Vietnam). 
93 BỘ LUẬT DÂN SỰ CỦA NƯỚC CỘNG HOÀ XÃ HỘI CHỦ NGHĨA VIỆT NAM [Civil 
Code of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam] Số: Không số [No Number] (1995) (Vietnam). 
94 Xuân Dân & Nguyễn Thanh Bình, Xây dựng nhà nước pháp quyền xã hội chủ nghĩa của 
dân, do dân, vì dân dưới sự lãnh đạo của đảng [Building a Rule of Law Society of the People, by the 
People, for the People, Under the Leadership of the Party], Tạp chí Cộng sản, Jan. 18, 2007, http:// 
www.tapchicongsan.org.vn/details.asp?Object=17134687&News_id=18159424 (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2010) (discussing the important role of the courts in creating a legal state). In the 
Rechtsstaat, instrumentalist views of law dominate such that the rule of law becomes rule by 
law. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory 92–93 (2004). 
95 See, e.g., United Nations Dev. Programme, Sector Development Situation: Jus-
tice/Legal Reform 1 (2005), available at http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/ADR/ADR/ 
ADR-working-site/VIETNAM/Desk-ResearchOutputs/Sector%Analysis-%20Justice%20and% 
20Legal%20Reform.doc (describing efforts to further the rule of law movement in Vietnam); 
Xuân Dân & Nguyễn Thanh Bình, supra note 94 (describing the Vietnamese government’s 
efforts to build socialist rule of law). 
96See Agreement between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam on Trade Relations, U.S.-Vietnam, July 13, 2000, Temp. State Dep’t No. 02-9, 2001 
WL 1792868. 
97 See USAID & STAR-Vietnam, Support for Trade Acceleration, http://www.starviet- 
nam.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) is an independent federal agency that supports foreign policy objectives by promot-
ing inter alia democracy, economic growth, agriculture and trade. See USAID, About USAID, 
http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid (last visited Apr. 20, 2010). 
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legal education among others.98 Likewise, the American Bar Associa-
tion also sponsors a rule of law initiative in Vietnam that provides sup-
port to local bar associations, law schools and government departments 
in the form of legal education programs.99 
 Even so, the United States is not alone in supporting rule of law 
activities in Vietnam. International donors have sponsored various rule 
of law projects in Vietnam since the beginning of economic reform.100 
These projects ranged from training and capacity building in the judi-
ciary, to support for enforcement of Vietnam’s new anti-corruption leg-
islation, to increasing public education with respect, to legal rights and 
legislative drafting exercises among many others.101 
 Notwithstanding all of these domestic and international efforts 
that have gone into building a series of formal legal institutions since 
1986, confidence in these institutions remains low. The question re-
mains whether, after more than two decades of reform, rule of law pro-
jects will succeed in the creation of strong formal legal institutions and 
the perception of an effective legal state.102 
A. Vietnam’s Formal Legal System 
 Vietnam’s courts form the backbone of its formal legal struc-
ture.103 There are three levels of courts in the system. Presently, there 
are 678 district and village level courts, the lowest level trial court.104 
There are sixty-three provincial level courts, the next highest level.105  
These provincial courts have both trial and appellate jurisdictions.106 
                                                                                                                      
98 See USAID & STAR-Vietnam, supra note 97. 
99 See, e.g., Am. Bar Assoc., ABA Rule of Law Initiative—Vietnam, http://www.abanet. 
org/rol/asia/vietnam.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2010) (detailing programs to improve 
legal education and support legal institutional development). 
99 See id. 
100 See, e.g., United Nations Dev. Programme, Viet Nam, Project Listings, http://www. 
undp.org.vn/what-we-do/more-projects-summaries/?&languageID=1&categoryName=Rule- 
of-law-and-Access (last visited Apr. 20, 2010) (listing various projects sponsored by the United 
Nations Development Programme). 
101 See United Nations Dev. Programme, supra note 95. 
102 See infra Part III.C. 
103 See Penelope Nicholson, Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law: The Vietnam Court Ex-
perience, 3 Austl. J. Asian L. 37, 41 (2001); Quinn, supra note 16, at 434; Brian JM Quinn, 
Note, Legal Reform and Its Context in Vietnam, 15 Colum. J. Asian L. 219, 221 (2002). 
104 See LUẬT TỔ CHỨC TOÀ ÁN NHÂN DÂN [Law on the Organization of the Peo-
ple’s Court] Số [No.]: 33/2002/QH10, Dieu [Clause] 11 (2002) (Vietnam); Quinn, supra 
note 16, at 437; Truong Hoa Binh, supra note 87, at 5. 
105 See Truong Hoa Binh, supra note 87, at 5. 
106 See LUẬT TỔ CHỨC TOÀ ÁN NHÂN DÂN [Law on the Organization of the Peo-
ple’s Court] Số [No.]: 33/2002/QH10, Dieu [Clause] 11; Quinn, supra note 16, at 437. 
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Litigants and criminal defendants are limited to only one appeal at the 
level higher than the one that heard the case at trial.107 So, for exam-
ple, parties to cases heard at the district and village level may appeal 
only once, exclusively, to the provincial courts.108 Finally, there are 
three courts at the highest level, the Supreme People’s Court, which sits 
in Hanoi with offices in both Ho Chi Minh City and Danang.109 The 
Supreme People’s Court is made up of 116 judges who sit in panels to 
hear appeals from the provincial courts and in rare circumstances also 
act as a trial court.110 
 The courts in Vietnam are faced with numerous challenges, some 
technical in nature, others structural. The most important structural 
challenge relates to the lack of independence in the court system. Al-
though by statute, courts in Vietnam are independent, they are not so 
in fact.111 Independence is lacking in at least three important ways. 
First, the court system derives its authority from the legislative body di-
rectly above it and is not an independent constitutional body.112 Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme People’s Court does not hear constitutional 
cases nor is it in a position to constrain the behavior of either the ex-
                                                                                                                      
107 See LUẬT TỔ CHỨC TOÀ ÁN NHÂN DÂN [Law on the Organization of the Peo-
ple’s Court] Số [No.]: 33/2002/QH10, Dieu [Clause] 11. 
108 See id. 
109 See The Supreme People’s Court of Vietnam, Benchbook Online: Supreme People’s 
Court, Sept. 7, 2006,  http://www.sotaythamphan.gov.vn/view_index.php (follow “1.1.1 
Supreme People’s Court” hyperlink). 
110 See Truong Hoa Binh, supra note 87, at 5–6. 
111 See LUẬT TỔ CHỨC TOÀ ÁN NHÂN DÂN [Law on the Organization of the Peo-
ple’s Court] Số [No.]: 33/2002/QH10, Dieu [Clause] 11 (requiring that courts adjudicate 
cases without outside interference). While many recognize the lack of court independ-
ence, there remains hope: 
In reality, in many cases, the judges and citizen jurors are negatively influ-
enced by lawyers, organizations, individuals, and government organizations in 
violation of the procedural rules, with large implications to the operations of 
the court in favor of themselves. For that reason, judges must be aware that 
they are responsible for the content and public nature of the court process. 
Because of that judges must be courageous and must stand against these out-
side influences . . . and should not permit any individual or government 
agency to interfere in the work of court for any reason. 
Vũ Thị Ngọc Hà, TĂNG CƯỜNG TÍNH ĐỘC LẬP CỦA CÁC THẨM PHÁN TRONG HOẠT 
ĐỘNG XÉT XỬ Ở VIỆT NAM [Strengthening Independent Actions of Judges in Trial Work 
in Vietnam], THÔNG TIN PHÁP LUẬT DÂN SỰ [Civil Law Network Blog], http://thong- 
tinphapluatdansu.wordpress.com/2009/08/14/3624/ (Aug. 14, 2009). 
112 Hiến pháp Cộng hòa Xã hội Chủ nghĩa Việt Nam [Const. of the Socialist Re-
public of Vietnam] art. 83 (indicating that the courts are subject to the oversight and 
control of the National Assembly). 
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ecutive or the National Assembly.113 Indeed, in some recent cases the 
National Assembly has attempted to exert its authority over the courts 
to order the Supreme Court to rehear a case that Assembly members 
perceived to be “incorrectly” decided.114 Similarly, the sixty-three courts 
at the provincial level submit to the authority of each off the provincial 
assemblies.115 At the district and village level, local governments have 
ultimate authority over the operations of the courts. This bureaucratic 
dependence on the executive decreases the ability of the courts to re-
main independent in high profile cases that may involve the interests of 
local governmental authorities.116 
                                                                                                                      
113 See Quinn, supra note 16, at 437. 
114 See, e.g., Lế Kiến, Tìm cơ chế sửa bản án “không được sai [Searching for Mechanisms to Fix 
a Verdict “Can’t Be Wrong”], Pháp Luặt, Aug.13, 2009, at 3 (describing how the National 
Assembly has inserted itself in the legal process); Mai Minh, Bảy năm đeo đuổi một vụ án 
[Seven Years Chasing One Case], Pháp Luặt, Aug. 14, 2009, at 5 (recounting the underlying 
facts of a contract dispute); Nghĩa Nhân, Án đụng trần” vẫn có thể xử lại [A Case Stood in Its 
Tracks Can Still be Reheard], Pháp Luặt, Aug. 17, 2009, at 3 (detailing an interview with the 
Chairman of National Assembly Judiciary Committee regarding the potential review of a 
contract case). A recent contract case between two domestic parties provides an example 
of how the National Assembly at times exerts its influence over the courts in cases of par-
ticular interest. See Mai Minh, supra. In 2002, Chau Tuan, a private company entered into a 
contract to sell one metric ton of unrefined sugar with a sugar content of forty-eight per-
cent to another company, Tien Son. Id. Chau Tuan sourced the required sugar from a 
middleman two steps removed from the manufacturer and took delivery without testing 
the actual sugar content and made delivery to Tien Son six months after signing the con-
tract. Id. Tien Son accepted the delivery without testing the actual sugar content and in 
turn sold the unrefined sugar on to another middleman. Id. The unrefined sugar was re-
sold a number of times until it was ultimately sold to a Chinese buyer. Id. Prior to taking 
delivery at the border, the Chinese buyer tested the actual sugar content and found it to be 
less than forty-four percent sugar. Id. The Chinese buyer refused delivery. Id. This set off a 
cascade of lawsuits as middlemen began suing for damages associated with the deficient 
product with damages being passed down the line of contract succession. Id. Ultimately, 
Tien Son sued Chau Tuan seeking 800 million Vietnamese Dong (approximately 54,000 
U.S. dollars) in damages. Id. In 2004, the provincial court of Ha Tinh heard the case and 
awarded Tien Son the damages sought. Id. Chau Tuan appealed the award to the Supreme 
People’s Court (the next highest level) and sent letters to various government agencies 
and party bodies seeking assistance. Id. In 2006, the Supreme People’s Court denied Chau 
Tuan’s final appeal and the original damages award was left in place. Id. The award, how-
ever, was not enforced against Chau Tuan. Nghĩa Nhân, supra. Recently, the Law and Jus-
tice Committee of the National Assembly undertook an investigation of the case and found 
numerous mistakes of process and substantive law with respect to both the trial and ap-
peal. Id. The National Assembly committee used its report into the deficiencies associated 
with this case to urge the Court to find a way to reconsider its decision in this particular 
case. Id. This has led the Chief Justice to suggest that the Supreme People’s Court change 
its procedures in order to permit it to rehear special cases at the request of the National 
Assembly following their final disposition. Id. 
115 See Truong Hao Binh, supra note 87, at 5. 
116 See Truong Trong Nghia, The Rule of Law in Vietnam: Theory and Practice, in The 
Rule of Law in Asia: Perspectives from the Pacific Rim 123, 131 (2000), available at 
 
294 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 30:273 
 Second, the enforcement of final judgments has been a continuing 
problem in the formal legal system. An essential element of a system of 
strong legal rights is the ability, once having had a dispute adjudicated, 
to have the judgment enforced in a timely and efficient manner. Al-
though formal legal institutions exist to enforce judgments in Vietnam, 
they are unable to function appropriately.117 The structure of the en-
forcement regime makes it difficult for parties with judgments against 
state agencies to seek enforcement.118 Private parties even run into diffi-
culties seeking enforcement of simple judgments against other private 
parties.119 This enforcement dilemma is a major stumbling block to the 
strengthening of formal legal rights in Vietnam.120 
 Third, although the courts are required to hear and decide cases 
without outside influence, this ideal is not always met in practice.121 
Notwithstanding the requirements of the law as written, courts are sub-
ject to the control of the Communist Party through the tham van or 
thinh thi an (pre-trial conference) “system.”122 Through the tham van 
                                                                                                                      
http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/programs/rol/rol_perspectives.htm (“The socialist Rule of 
Law state does not separate its power but unites it in the legislative branch . . . which has 
the authority to make laws, but delegates the administrative authority to the government 
and judicial authority to the court.”). 
117 See Law on Enforcement of Civil Judgments, Vietnam L. & Legal F., May 2009, at 19. 
Members of the bar in Vietnam are hoping to rectify this long-standing problem with the 
passage of a new enforcement law to replace the 2004 Ordinance on Enforcement of Civil 
Judgments. See id. 
118 See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 23, at 653. 
119 See, e.g., Van Đoàn, Hơn Bạn Năm Không Thi Hành án [Seven Years of Not Enforcing an 
Order], Pháp Luặt, Aug.15, 2009, at 10 (describing a recent case that provides an example 
of the difficulties private parties have in enforcing simple judgments against other private 
parties). In March 2006, a district level court in Long An province awarded the plaintiff in 
a dispute over a land sale, title to the land, which he had bought but which was then sub-
sequently occupied by the defendant. See id. As part of the judgment, the court ordered 
the defendant to vacate the land and to dissemble any structures he had illegally built 
upon the land. See id. The plaintiff immediately sought to have the judgment enforced. See 
id. Nevertheless, three years later, the local judgment enforcement had not enforced the 
judgment, citing the necessity of the defendant to voluntarily give up his right to the land. 
See id. 
120 See Law on Enforcement of Civil Judgments, supra note 117, at 19 (describing the weak-
nesses of the current Vietnamese Ordinance on Enforcement of Civil Judgments which led 
to confusion and ineffective coordination among civil judgment management agencies 
and the necessity for legal reform). 
121 See Brian JM Quinn, Soccer, Glitter, and Corruption 1, 11 (Mar. 20, 2006) (Boston Col-
lege Law School, Working Paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=998869 (citing LUẬT TỔ CHỨC TOÀ ÁN NHÂN DÂN [Law on the Organi-
zation of the People’s Court] Số [No.]: 33/2002/QH10). 
122 See id. The Vietnamese version is a formalized version of what happens in Chinese 
courts or previously in the former Soviet Union, where it is known as “telephone justice.” 
See Kathryn Hendley, “Telephone Law” and the “Rule of Law”: The Russian Case, Hague J. on 
 
2010] Farmers, Middlemen, and the New Rule of Law Movement 295 
system judges, prosecutors, and the party apparatus meet to discuss the 
important aspects of cases of particular importance to the Communist 
Party prior to the public court hearing.123 At these meetings, which are 
closed to representatives of the defendant (in criminal matters), judges 
are susceptible to pressure to ensure the outcome of proceedings.124 
B. Perceptions of Effectiveness of Formal Legal System 
 The lack of structural independence in the judiciary helps create a 
perception locally that the formal legal system is corrupt and unreliable 
or at least in certain cases that the actual facts and law will not be de-
terminative of the final outcomes.125 In reality, the current local percep-
tions of the formal legal system in Vietnam are poor and the perceived 
strength of legal rights so weak that one might expect economic growth 
to have suffered as a consequence if in fact strong legal rights and for-
mal institutions were a prerequisite to economic growth.126 
 The work of McMillan and Woodruff helps to explain the seeming 
paradox of Vietnam’s economic growth.127 In a series of papers, they 
reported the results of surveys of private manufacturing firms con-
ducted in Vietnam’s two major urban centers, Ho Chi Minh City and 
                                                                                                                      
Rule L. 241, 242 (2009) (describing the Soviet system of “telephone law” in which out-
comes of cases allegedly come from orders issued over the phone by those with political 
power rather than through the application of law). Dang Van Luan, in a 2006 interview, 
noted that judges are not required to comply with the results of the thinh thi an or the tham 
van process. See Phương Thảo, Ngành Tòa án Trước hết Phải Tự tin [The Court System Above 
Needs Self-Confidence], Việt Báo, Dec. 4, 2006, available at http://vietbao.vn/Xa-hoi/Nganh-
Toa-an-truoc-het-phai-tu-tin/30156009/126/. 
123 See Quinn, supra note 121, at 11. 
124 See id. The system is potentially subject to abuse. See id. Tan Ngoc Suong, a well-
known figure in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta was recently prosecuted in a very controversial 
case. See Ulterior Motives Hinted at in Verdict Against Labor Hero, Thanh Niên, Nov. 27, 2009, 
available at http://www.lookatvietnam.com/2009/11/ulterior-motives-hinted-at-in-verdict-
against-labor-hero.html. Tan Ngoc Suong, the director of a model cooperative farm, was 
convicted by a local court of illegally establishing and maintaining a slush fund at the Song 
Hu farm and sentenced to prison time. See id. On appeal, the verdict was upheld. See id. In 
response to what Vietnamese observers viewed as an injustice, members of the central 
government called on the National Assembly to review the case. See id. Local rumors held 
that parochial land interests motivated this prosecution. See Pha Lê, Vụ án bà Sương Cần 
Được Xem Xét ỡ Cấp Cao Hơn [The Case Should be Considered at a Higher Level], Pháp Luặt, 
Nov. 25, 2009, available at http://www.vnexpress.net/GL/Phap-luat/2009/11/3BA16064/ 
(noting the rumors); Ulterior Motives Hinted at in Verdict Against Labor Hero, supra. 
125 See Pha Lê, supra note 124; Ulterior Motives Hinted at in Verdict Against Labor Hero, su-
pra note 124. 
126 See Quinn, supra note 121, at 12–13. 
127 See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 21, at 637; McMillan & 
Woodruff, Private Order, supra note 21, at 2421–22, 2430–32. 
296 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 30:273 
Hanoi, from 1995 to 1997.128 In general, these papers revealed an econ-
omy dominated by relational contracting and a lack of trust for the for-
mal legal system.129 The picture painted by McMillan and Woodruff’s 
survey results illustrated widespread reliance on informal contracting to 
accommodate the perceived weakness of the formal legal structures.130 
Indeed, few market participants expressed a belief that they could con-
tract in the shadow of the law.131 Less than ten percent of respondents 
thought that the courts or any other governmental agency could assist 
them in contract enforcement.132 In addition, McMillan and Woodruff 
found that Vietnamese firms compensated for the inadequacy of formal 
legal structures and weak legal rights through a combination of rela-
tional contracting and other informal institutions.133 Self-enforcement 
incentives in the form of reputation and intensive screening of potential 
business partners were the most common informal institutions that par-
ties reported relying upon.134 
 Since McMillan and Woodruff’s study, others have investigated the 
perceived strength of formal legal institutions in Vietnam and have also 
found them wanting.135 According to a survey conducted by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2004, only 20% of re-
spondents in rural areas stated that judgments of the courts are “just 
and fair.”136 Instead, there is a clear perception that the formal legal 
system is corrupt and unreliable.137 For instance, 74% of respondents 
indicated that the honesty of judges was important to the outcome a 
                                                                                                                      
128 See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 21 at 637; McMillan & 
Woodruff, Private Order, supra note 21, at 2421. 
129 See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 21, at 637–38, 644; 
McMillan & Woodruff, Private Order, supra note 21, at 2421, 2430–32. 
130 See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 21, at 640–42; McMillan & 
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131 See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 21, at 640; McMillan & 
Woodruff, Private Order, supra note 21, at 2431. 
132 See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 21, at 641; McMillan & 
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groups. See id. at 647. 
135 See United Nations Dev. Programme, Access to Justice in Vietnam: Survey from 
a People’s Perspective 15 (2004), available at http://www.undp.org.vn/digitalAssets/4/ 
4667_A2J__Engl_.pdf; McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 21, at 644. 
136 See United Nations Dev. Programme, supra note 135, at 13–15. 
137 See id. 
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formal legal proceeding, while only 65% thought having the law and 
facts on one’s side was important.138 Furthermore, according to the 
World Bank, a simple contractual dispute requires an average of 295 
days to each resolution in the courts.139 The cost of resolving such a 
dispute is often equivalent to 31% of the contract’s value, thus making 
resort to courts ineffective as a business matter.140 Even if one were to 
get resolution through the courts, the enforcement process is likely to 
denude the contract of any remaining value. 
 The lack of confidence in the formal system is shared by firms.141 
A 2009 survey of business in Vinh Long Province conducted as a part of 
the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry’s (VCCI) competi-
tiveness study, found confidence in the formal institutions to be rela-
tively low.142 For example, only 11.5% of respondents felt that local au-
thorities were usually or always predictable in their implementation of 
central laws.143 Thirty-six percent reported that government officials 
used compliance with local regulations to extract rents.144 The percep-
tion of widespread corruption in the formal system likely has an effect 
on the firms’ perception of the formal legal system. For example, only 
27.86% of respondents from Vinh Long felt that the formal legal sys-
tem always or usually provided a mechanism for firms to appeal the 
corrupt behavior of officials.145 Only 61% of respondents were confi-
dent that the legal system would uphold property or contract rights.146 
Not surprisingly, merely one-third of Vinh Long respondents reported 
using the courts or other formal legal institutions to resolve disputes.147 
A 2005 survey by the Vietnamese Communist Party on perceptions of 
                                                                                                                      
138 See id. at 13. 
139 See The Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev. (IMF) & The World Bank, Do-
ing Business 2010: Reforming Through Difficult Times 162 (2009), available at http:// 
www.doingbusiness.org/documents/fullreport/2010/DB10-full-report.pdf. 
140 See id.; Van Đoàn, supra note 119, at 10. 
141 Vietnam Chamber of Commerce & Industry (VCCI) & Vietnam Competitive-
ness Initiative (VNCI), The Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Index 2009: Meas-
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142 See id. 
143 See USAID & Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative (VNCI), 2009 Vietnam Provincial 
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146 See id. 
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corruption found it to be rife, especially in the courts.148 Fifty percent 
of respondents who dealt with the courts reported having had to make 
payments to court officials in connection with having their cases 
heard.149 
 The reality of corruption in the court system reinforces these per-
ceptions.150 The case of Mr. Pham Cong Bang, former chief judge of 
Phu Ninh district in Quang Nam province, is a representative exam-
ple.151 Judge Bang was accused of accepting six million Vietnamese 
Dong from a litigant at his home. In exchange for the cash payment, 
Mr. Bang was asked to help force the settlement of an economic dis-
pute in favor of one of the parties.152 Although crooked judges like Mr. 
Bang can be apprehended, such progress is undercut by the fact that 
success in prosecuting corruption cases is not high.153 A report from 
Dong Nai Province noted that nine of the thirteen corruption cases 
handled by the courts in that province in 2009 ended in the Vietnam-
ese equivalent of a hung jury (huong an treo).154 
 Given the level of activity directed at reforming them and the chal-
lenges formal legal institutions in Vietnam continue to face, this Article 
revisits the role played by informal actors and informal institutions. 
This Article extends the work of McMillan and Woodruff of more than 
a decade ago by investigating contracting relationships of fruit farmers 
in the Mekong Delta.155 In particular, it seeks to understand the role of 
informal legal institutions in backing trading relationships and prevent-
ing or resolving disputes. In general, the results of our study confirm 
that economic actors rely little on formal legal institutions. In the ab-
sence of strong legal rights these actors are nonetheless able to find 
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private ordering solutions to assure reasonable levels of contract per-
formance.156 The results of our study reinforce the point made by Mil-
haupt and Pistor among others that legal reform is a very long road 
measured in decades and not a simple technical fix.157 
III. Mekong Delta Fruit Markets 
 The structure of the market for pomelos in the Mekong Delta is 
characterized by a high degree of competition.158 The few thousand 
pomelo farmers in the region sell what are essentially undifferentiated 
commodities to hundreds of buyers.159 There are some 300 or so spe-
cialist middlemen who float the canals and riverways of the Delta buy-
ing fruit from farmers.160 Middlemen transport the fruit by boat to local 
floating markets elsewhere in the Mekong Delta—Cai Rang and Phong 
Dien being the best known of these markets—or to larger wholesale 
markets in Ho Chi Minh City, approximately 135 kilometers to the 
north.161 Ninety-five percent of pomelos are consumed domestically.162 
Fruit that is not consumed domestically is sold to local fruit processors 
for canning and export.163 Middlemen play a critical role in connecting 
isolated Delta farmers to each of the local, regional and international 
markets.164 
 We conducted surveys in 2005 and 2006 of 180 pomelo farmers 
and forty-seven middlemen in three districts at the center of fruit pro-
duction in Vietnam: Binh Minh and Tra On (in Vinh Long Province) 
and Chau Thanh (in Hau Giang Province).165 Located just north of 
Can Tho, Vietnam’s fourth largest city, Binh Minh and Tra On districts 
have relied for many years on fruit production for much of their in-
come.166 In 2005, more than half (54.8%) of Vinh Long’s provincial 
income came from agriculture and fisheries, including approximately 
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160 See id. at 18; Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. 
161 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. 
162 See Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, supra note 158, at 7. 
163 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. 
164 See id. 
165 See id. 
166 See id. 
300 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 30:273 
14% from the production of varieties of fruit, including lychees, lon-
gans, rambutans, mangoes and pomelos.167 That same year, an area of 
about 35,000 hectares in Vinh Long was reserved for growing a variety 
of fruit, 5300 hectares of which was dedicated to pomelo cultivation.168 
Though the Mekong Delta has long been a producer of fruit, the large-
scale cultivation of fruit, including pomelos, is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon, only developing significantly since the 1990s.169 Our surveys 
provide information about typical pomelo farmers and their market 
transactions.170 In particular, these surveys shed light on how, in the 
absence of strong legal rights, farmers and middlemen structure their 
transactions.171 
A. Typical Farmer 
 By almost any definition, farmers’ investments in the cultivation of 
fruit trees are a long-term investment.172 Fruit trees take time to grow 
and then give fruit (approximately three years to bear fruit).173 Invest-
ing in fruit is also mutually exclusive with other uses for a farmer’s gar-
den—uses that might be more short term in nature (for example, rice 
production).174 Consequently, farmers investing in fruit production 
must be reasonably assured that there is a stable market for their fruit 
before making such an investment.175 Even so growth in the production 
of pomelos in recent years has been rapid.176 In recent years, the 
amount of land in Vinh Long province dedicated to the cultivation of 
fruit trees, particularly pomelos, grew by 24.75% per year.177 
 The Mekong Delta is the agricultural center of Vietnam.178 Though 
rice is a staple commodity, fruit production is the primary source of in-
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come for many of the Delta’s farmers.179 Farmers grow a wide variety of 
fruit, including pomelos, mangos, litchees, rambutans, among many 
others.180 For the most part, farmers who grow fruit do so for commer-
cial purposes, selling 91% of their annual harvest for cash.181 A few 
thousand such farmers in the Mekong Delta grow pomelos.182 Two va-
rieties of pomelos—Nam Roi and Da Xanh—account for almost 95% of 
all cultivation of pomelos.183 
 Pomelo farmers in the survey group grow pomelos on plots averag-
ing 6900 square miles, less than one hectare, in size.184 Pomelo trees are 
long-lasting, living between ten and twenty years and giving fruit after 
just three.185 Unlike other crops, like rice, pomelo trees require lower 
intensity to cultivate and are hardy.186 Farmers report average annual 
revenues from pomelo sales in the range of 30 million Vietnamese 
Dong, or approximately $1875, per year.187 When compared to the culti-
vation of rice, pomelo cultivation is a profitable endeavor for farmers.188 
 The typical farmer in the Mekong Delta is isolated. The Delta is 
comprised of a network of interlaced canals and riverways that make 
road travel between villages difficult, if not impossible, in some areas.189 
In 2000, for example, only slightly more than 61.7% of communes in 
Vihn Long province had paved roads that could support automobile 
transportation to the village center.190 Even fewer had roads that could 
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support automobile traffic to households outside the commune cen-
ter.191 Moreover, with less than 100,000 phone lines (86,452 land and 
9930 cell) for a population of over 1,000,000 (as of 2006), few farmers 
have direct access to much by way of market information.192 Most must 
rely on middlemen for such information.193 Farmers with boats, how-
ever, have the ability to sell at least a portion of their fruit on the local 
markets, floating markets in the Delta, or to the wholesale markets in 
Ho Chi Minh City.194 Yet, the large majority, 85%, report that they sell 
their fruit to the market exclusively through middlemen.195 
B. Typical Middleman 
 Middlemen are crucial players in the commerce for fruit. There are 
approximately 300 middlemen who travel throughout the Mekong 
Delta buying pomelos from farmers and transporting them to floating 
and regional markets in the Mekong Delta, markets in Ho Chi Minh 
City, or to fruit processing factories for the export market.196 The survey 
conducted by the authors in 2006 included forty-seven middlemen in 
Binh Minh, Tra On, and Chau Thanh districts who specialize in buying 
and selling pomelos.197 This survey provides information about the typi-
cal middleman operating in the Mekong Delta and his market transac-
tions.198 
 On average, these middlemen have been in the pomelo business 
for almost eleven years.199 Middlemen tend to specialize, with 97.8% of 
respondents report buying and selling only a single variety of pomelo.200 
Many are also pomelo farmers themselves.201 As a result, they are very 
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attuned to the market and fruit quality.202 More than 95% of middle-
men claim that they have a better sense of the quality of the fruit they 
are buying than the farmers selling it.203 In addition, middlemen are 
unanimous in their opinion that they have better market and price in-
formation than farmers.204 
 Though barriers to entry and exit from the middleman business 
are relatively low, they are not insignificant. There are no special licens-
ing requirements for middlemen nor are there any formal trade asso-
ciations or informal ethnic associations that might limit participation in 
the market.205 There are, however, three real barriers to entry. First, 
middlemen face the expense of a boat. The average sized boat is forty-
three tons and can cost between $3000 and $5000.206 Fifty-five percent 
of surveyed middlemen report owning their own boat, a substantial 
long-term capital investment, the type which parties might be hesitant 
to make if the risk of opportunism was high enough.207 
 A second barrier to entry is access to credit. Middlemen are highly 
credit constrained. They require capital to finance their transactions 
during the two week period they spend traveling through the Delta 
making purchases from farmers. Such capital requirements can be sub-
stantial. The average middleman, for instance, collects fourteen tons of 
fruit per month.208 Assuming an average price of approximately 3000 
Vietnamese Dong per kilogram, the middleman must be able to fi-
nance forty-two million Vietnamese Dong, approximately $2,600, for up 
to a month while he collects and then markets his fruit.209 Because 
most middlemen do business as sole proprietors or without any busi-
ness registration at all, they lack the ability to fund their own capital 
requirements through formal credit lines at banks. Middlemen often 
sell their pomelos to wholesalers in the Ho Chi Minh City market on a 
consignment basis placing further pressure on the capital requirement. 
Interviews with wholesalers in Tam Binh, the main pomelo wholesale 
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market in Thu Duc District in Ho Chi Minh City, reveal that the major-
ity of wholesalers receive credit from middlemen, sometimes even up to 
100%.210 
 A third barrier to entry is access to a trading network in regional 
and wholesale markets in Ho Chi Minh City. Interviews by the authors 
with middlemen in the three biggest floating markets in the Mekong 
Delta, namely Cai Rang, Phong Dien, and Phung Hiep, reveal that 
some middlemen find it difficult to sell their pomelos in the largest 
markets in Ho Chi Minh City because they lack reliable partners 
there.211 Generally, the longer a middleman has been in the business, 
the more likely he is to develop useful social networks and relationships 
with wholesalers in the Tam Binh market in Ho Chi Minh City. 
C. Typical Transaction 
 Farmers normally do not harvest fruit until they have found a 
buyer.212 Pomelos can be left on the tree for some time without fear of 
the fruit going bad.213 This allows farmers to wait on the market and, 
within limits, entertain offers from a number of potential buyers. 
Farmers can harvest all or just a portion of their crop at any given point 
once they are ripe. In addition, pomelos also have a relatively long 
“shelf life” once they have been harvested; their thick skins permit the 
fruit to hold moisture for a relatively long period, thereby extending 
the post-harvest period during which farmers might be able to enter-
tain market offers.214 
 Farmers have at least three ways of selling their crop. First, they 
can sell it on the retail market.215 When selling to retail consumers, 
farmers typically price by the piece. Selling fruit directly to the retail 
market, however, can be an expensive proposition. To do so requires 
adequate transportation, typically in the form of a large boat, as well as 
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time because a large number of sales may be needed to dispose of a few 
tons of pomelos on the retail market. Additionally, farmers can sell 
their fruit to middlemen who ply the waterways of the Mekong Delta.216 
Middlemen will then resell the fruit in larger markets. A typical pur-
chase arrangement requires the middleman to buy a farmer’s entire 
garden, not simply fruit of particular sizes or quality.217 One of the au-
thors observed a middleman buying a garden. In this representative 
transaction, a middleman made an unsolicited approach to a farmer 
and offered to buy his fruit.218 Then, the middleman and the farmer 
walked around the garden together while the middleman quickly 
counted and evaluated the general quality of fruit on the trees. They 
then estimated the total kilos in the garden and agreed upon a price 
for the whole garden and the payment terms. Another common 
method of sale is similar to the second, but the farmer agrees to sell 
something less than his entire garden to the middleman.219 From the 
middleman’s perspective, this is less than optimal as it raises the costs 
associated with filling his boat. 
 Typically, when middlemen make purchases, they leave a deposit, 
up to thirty percent, and promise to return in several days, or even 
weeks, while the farmer harvests the garden.220 When the middleman 
returns to collect the fruit, he will usually complete payment and the 
farmer and middleman then part ways. 
 When middlemen are unable to get access to working capital, or 
when the market price is unknown to the middlemen, farmers will 
sometimes agree to defer receiving payment until after the middleman 
sells all of the fruit in the floating markets of the Mekong Delta or the 
wholesale markets in Ho Chi Minh City.221 The time period over which 
credit is granted spans anywhere from three days to three months.222 
During this period the farmer bears the risk that the middleman might 
not return to complete payment.223 
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 Through their studies, McMillan and Woodruff find a correlation 
between the granting of credit and the degree of lock-in between busi-
ness partners.224 They conclude that high switching costs are the moti-
vating factors for the granting of credit.225 Economic lock-in creates a 
second period effect in what might otherwise be a one-off transac-
tion.226 In such a situation, lock-in can constrain opportunistic behav-
ior.227 Yet, monopoly buying practices in fruit markets appear to be ex-
tremely rare and there appears to be little economic “lock-in” of the 
sort envisioned by McMillan and Woodruff.228 In fact, more than 60% 
of middlemen report that the market to buy pomelos from farmers is 
moderate to very competitive.229 Farmers report a similar story.230 More 
than 60% report being approached by more than four middlemen 
every year, with 46% percent reporting being approached by more than 
six middlemen every year. 6.8% of farmers report one or fewer ap-
proaches per year.231 
 McMillan and Woodruff’s hypothesis suggests that farmers enjoy-
ing fewer approaches from middlemen, indicating greater lock-in, 
should be more willing to grant credit than farmers with enjoying more 
competitive environments.232 Here, however, a correlation between the 
lack of competition—that is, high switching costs—and willingness of 
farmers to grant credit is lacking. Instead, farmers appear to be uni-
formly willing to grant credit to middlemen with little regard to the de-
gree of competition for their fruit. Farmers in more competitive mar-
kets (greater than six approaches per year) are just as likely to grant 
credit as farmers in less competitive markets.233 
1. Contracts 
 The form of contract used in the Mekong Delta is befitting of the 
setting: informal.234 Only about 10% of farmers report relying on writ-
ten contracts. 46.1% of farmers rely on oral contracts while 42.2% re-
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port no agreement at all with buyers, the functional equivalent to an 
oral contract.235 Middlemen report a similar experience, with 85% rely-
ing on oral contracts.236 The prevalence of oral contracts in this market 
is intriguing because delayed payment terms create risks that are exac-
erbated by the lack of written documentation, thus giving rise to the 
potential for disagreement as memories fade. 
 The survey data further highlights a relationship between reliance 
on written versus oral contracts and the amount of competition in the 
market.237 Farmers who report little to moderate competition for their 
fruit (zero to two approaches per year) rely exclusively on oral contracts 
to document their sales to middlemen.238 Farmers who report extremely 
competitive markets, on the other hand, are more likely to rely on writ-
ten contracts.239 44.4% of farmers who entertain offers from more than 
twenty middlemen per year also report relying on written contracts.240 
Where there is less economic lock-in and competition is more prevalent, 
it appears clear that buyers are more likely to attempt to protect their 
positions and demand written contracts.241 The strength of the legal 
rights created by these written contracts is less obvious. 
2. Dispute Resolution 
 Disputes between farmers and middlemen are not unexpected. 
Indeed, 45% of middlemen report knowing of disputes in which a 
farmer broke an agreement.242 Thirty-four percent of middlemen re-
port having had problems with farmers themselves.243 Of the middle-
men who report having performance problems with farmers, half re-
port that farmers cancelled contracts in order to sell the contracted 
upon fruit to another buyer for a higher price.244 Other problems re-
late to disputes about price and quality of fruit upon delivery.245 
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 Although cheating by middlemen is not altogether common, it is 
not distant from the minds of many farmers.246 Farmers also report hav-
ing trouble with middlemen, though in smaller numbers. While only 
10% of farmers report having had difficulties with middlemen in the 
previous five years, nearly a third, approximately 31%, of farmers in the 
survey report knowing someone who was cheated by a middleman.247 
The most common problem reported by farmers is the failure of mid-
dlemen to make complete payment for fruit that they take.248 
 For the most part, farmers manage disputes by simply bearing 
their losses and moving on. Of those farmers who reported problems 
with middlemen, 44% terminated their business relationship without 
resorting to any third-party for assistance.249 The next most common 
response was to attempt to negotiate a solution with the middleman 
without third-party assistance.250 Of those farmers who went to third-
parties, only 22% of farmers went to either the formal dispute resolu-
tion system (for example, courts) or a quasi-formal system (for exam-
ple, local law enforcement or government officials) for help in resolv-
ing a contract dispute.251 Given the itinerant nature of middleman and 
the high costs of tracking down those who default, formal dispute reso-
lution would not often be cost effective and moving on might be the 
only option reasonably available to farmers.252 
 In the absence of strong legal rights and an effective dispute reso-
lution system, one would expect farmers to rely on private ordering 
structures, like relational contracting, to increase the likelihood of con-
tract performance. Vietnam’s pomelo farmers, however, do not. The 
farmer’s live-and-let-live approach has implications for the way farmers 
do business and make investments often leading them to make sub-
optimal investments in fruit cultivation.253 In theory, weak legal rights 
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and a lack of reliance on private ordering structures could limit upward 
growth potential.254 One would suspect that this is not an equilibrium 
position for market participants. The farmer’s approach, however, does 
not extend to doing additional business with a middleman with whom 
the farmer had had a previous dispute. In those situations, more than 
95% of farmers refused to transact.255 
 Middlemen, on the other hand, exhibit different tendencies with 
regard to dispute resolution. Where nearly half of farmers will simply 
bear a loss and move on, only 16% of middlemen are willing to do so in 
the event of a default by a farmer.256 More than 80% will attempt to ne-
gotiate an equitable solution or go to third parties to seek a resolu-
tion.257 The difference in the approaches  of farmers and middlemen 
in resolving contract disputes is likely a function of the variation in en-
forcement costs.258 
 Unlike farmers, middlemen seek performance of their contracts 
when confronted with disputes from identifiable and stationary counter-
parties.259 Because farmers are easily located, middlemen can cheaply 
initiate negotiations or bring in third-parties, like local policemen, in 
order to resolve a contractual dispute.260 In this context, written con-
tracts become valuable, not so much for their legal force, but rather for 
their moral force.261 Without this moral force it can be difficult for a 
middleman, an outsider, to engage a third party, like a policeman, to 
assist in negotiations with the defaulting farmer, an insider.262 
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 Conversely, for farmers, written contracts in complex transactions 
are less valuable.263 If the middleman absconds on a promise to pay, he 
is unlikely to return. Farmers are then left holding an empty promise. 
Since middlemen are itinerant, farmers’ enforcement costs against 
middlemen are prohibitively high.264 Farmers are unlikely to be able to 
expend the resources necessary to track down middlemen to seek per-
formance.265 It is no surprise that, in such situations, farmers put little 
stock in written contracts and formal legal rights.266 Furthermore, one 
can see that, absent other changes, more efficient formal legal struc-
ture may not do much to address the disparity in enforcement costs 
that dissuades farmers from attempting to access the formal system. 
3. Reputation and Relational Contracting 
 Where legal rights are weak and parties are engaging in complex 
transactions, one expects to see parties rely on private ordering struc-
tures, like reputation mechanisms or relational contracting.267 Reputa-
tion and relational contracting provide parties with an extended time 
horizon over which to do business, thereby reducing the value of acting 
opportunistically.268 The deterrence provided by an extended time ho-
rizon can be a powerful and reasonably low-cost self-help strategy.269 
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Where legal rights are weak, these low-cost contracting strategies can 
provide a reasonable alternative to formal enforcement mechanisms.270 
 Not surprisingly, farmers report in large numbers that a buyer’s 
reputation is important in their decisions whether or not to do busi-
ness.271 Yet, in order for reputation to have a valuable incentive effect, 
buyers and sellers must be able to costlessly generate and transmit 
credible reputation information to potential counterparties.272 Social 
institutions can often facilitate functioning reputation markets. In the 
Mekong Delta, however, it is not clear that there exists an efficient 
mechanism for middlemen to transmit reputation information—either 
directly or indirectly—about their quality as business partners to farm-
ers with whom they intend to do business. Rather, highly localized so-
cial institutions of the Mekong Delta appear ill-suited to function as 
efficient reputational intermediaries in the region’s fruit markets for 
many reasons. 
 First, farmers are relatively isolated. Their communications and 
transportation links are not good.273 Although farmers can gather in-
formally with their close neighbors and share information among 
themselves about the reputations of middlemen, such information is 
highly localized.274 Furthermore, a poor reputation in one area will not 
likely affect a middleman’s reputation in another because farmers, lim-
ited in terms of transportation and communications, have little ability 
to convey such information beyond their immediate circle of relation-
ships absent some other intermediary.275 
 Second, whereas in other well-known studies of private ordering, 
strong ethnic, cultural or family ties bind buyers and sellers together, 
such ties are not significant barriers to entry into Vietnam’s fruit trad-
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ing business.276 In general, the continuity of social relationships and the 
threat of exclusion from a group can create a powerful incentive for 
self-enforcement equivalent.277 Where buyers and sellers are bound to-
gether by such ties, reputation can be a powerful mechanism. In the 
fruit business, however, there is no evidence that any particular ethnic 
or family ties bind farmers to middlemen with whom they do busi-
ness.278 Instead, the area studied was dominated by farmers of the ma-
jority Kinh group.279 The lack of significant entry barriers in the trading 
business suggests that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to exclude 
bad actors through ostracism by a group.280 
 Though there are a number of formal institutions that have the 
potential of facilitating reputation information, none presently do so. In 
any event, participation in such institutions is relatively low. For exam-
ple, only twenty-two percent of farmers report being members of any 
formal organization at all.281 The most common of these is the produc-
tion cooperative (hop tac xa), the main function of which is to provide 
technical and extension services.282 Few farmers who participate in these 
cooperatives report that these organizations provide information about 
the marketplace, reputations of middlemen, or serve to resolve poten-
tial problems with middlemen.283 The Vietnam Fruit Association, a trade 
association for fruit farmers and the fruit industry, also fails to play a 
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significant role as a reputation intermediary.284 Although, the associa-
tion is less localized than cooperatives and might be well placed to pro-
vide reputation information, it does not play a gatekeeping role for ei-
ther farmers or middlemen.285 In name, it is a “national” association but 
it is not truly present in many farming communities.286 Even where it is 
present, it does not appear to be organized to coordinate information 
sharing of the type that would be useful to farmers or middlemen in 
assessing the quality of a potential trading partner.287 
 Finally, as noted above, barriers to entry and exit for middlemen 
are low.288 Ordinarily, market access and the threat of market exclusion 
can be important incentives for market participants to conform to ex-
pectations.289 Middlemen neither benefit from, nor are they constrained 
by, natural territorial monopolies.290 They are itinerant, ranging great 
distances in their buying and selling activities, and can drop in and out 
of the business at will.291 A majority of middlemen lease their boats, fur-
ther increasing the variability of their participation.292 To compound 
matters, there are no administrative regulations that govern their busi-
ness activity or formal organizations that they might be required to join 
to enter this business.293 Nor is there any formal or informal association 
of traders that might act to filter bad actors out of the market.294 In sum, 
                                                                                                                      
284 See infra tbl.7, What Information Do You Get From Local Organizations?. Outside the 
fruit market, there are examples of trade associations playing a role as a reputation inter-
mediary. See Greif, supra note 67, at 300; Bernstein, supra note 53, at 132–35, 138–39. In 
those cases, however, membership in the association is required to participate in the busi-
ness activity. See Greif, supra note 67, at 279; Bernstein, supra note 53, at 132–35, 138–39. 
In the diamond industry, participation in the diamond association is required in order to 
participate in the market. Bernstein, supra note 53, at 119; see Barak D. Richman, Ethnic 
Networks, Extralegal Certainty, and Globalisation: Peering Into the Diamond Industry, in Legal 
Certainty Beyond the State (Volkmar Gessner, ed., forthcoming). 
285 Compare Bernstein, supra note 53, at 133–34, 138–44 (examining the diamond asso-
ciation’s role in the market), with Quinn & Vu, supra note 2 (finding a lack of a role of the 
Fruit Association in the market). 
286 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. Less than twenty percent of farmers report being 
members. See id. 
287 See infra tbl.7, What Information Do You Get from Local Organizations?; see also Quinn & 
Vu, supra note 2. 
288 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. 
289 See Bernstein, supra note 53, at 138–44; Landa, supra note 53, at 351–52. 
290 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. 
291 See id. 
292 See id. 55.3% of middlemen do not own the boats that they use. See id. 
293 Compare Bernstein, supra note 53, at 119–20 n.6 & 121 nn. 11, 13 (discussing the by-
laws of the association regulating the diamond marketplace), with Quinn & Vu, supra note 
2 (finding a lack of regulations). 
294 Compare Bernstein, supra note 53, at 119–21, 138–43 (noting both the formal and 
informal bonds within the diamond business), with Quinn & Vu, supra note 2 (finding a 
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these low barriers to entry and exit make the threat of exclusion of bad 
actors difficult, if not impossible to effectively enforce.295 
 Farmers’ networks in the Mekong Delta fail to perform private or-
dering functions for two reasons. First, farmers and their networks do 
not necessarily overlap with the networks of middlemen.296 Whereas 
buyers and sellers in other markets, like the diamond markets of New 
York City, share important social and cultural ties outside of the dia-
mond trade, that is not necessarily the case in the Mekong Delta.297 
Farmers and middlemen, though they share cultural and ethnic traits, 
are brought together almost exclusively for the purpose of transacting 
business. Second, farmers are unable to exclude bad actors from the 
trade. While in the case of diamond traders, exclusion from the social 
and cultural group, and thus effectively from the diamond trade, is an 
effective deterrent to opportunistic behavior, no such power of exclu-
sion exists in the fruit markets of the Mekong Delta.298 Although there 
are barriers to entry for middlemen, none are controlled by farmers.299 
In the absence of an excludable common social network, there is little 
room for reputation to be an effective deterrent.300 Finally, farmers’ 
networks tend to be highly localized while middlemen can range great 
distances.301 The intense localization of reputation information means 
that the costs to a middleman for opportunistic behavior can be heavily 
discounted.302 
                                                                                                                      
lack of any informal or formal associations). While this is true at the farm-gate, there is 
some evidence from interviews with middlemen that at the wholesale level—for example at 
the Ho Chi Minh City markets—middlemen face higher barriers to entry. See Quinn & Vu, 
supra note 2. 
295 Compare Bernstein, supra note 53, at 138–41 (contending that diamond traders were 
connected by a common cultural and ethnic background that made reputation a powerful 
mechanism for self-enforcement), and Landa, supra note 53, at 349, 351–52 (providing 
that Chinese merchants were bound by common ethnicity and family ties that constrained 
market behavior), with Quinn & Vu, supra note 2 (finding a lack of barriers to entry and 
exit into the market for middlemen in the Mekong Delta). 
296 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. 
297 Compare Bernstein, supra note 53, at 139–41 (describing the cultural and reputa-
tional bonds between those in the diamond markets), with Quinn & Vu, supra note 2 (find-
ing a lack of any informal association). 
298 See Richman, supra note 284; Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. 
299 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. 
300 See McMillan & Woodruff, Private Order, supra note 21, at 2440 (stating that without 
community cooperation in refusing to trade with those in bad standing, reputation-based 
sanctioning ceases to function as a deterrent to future cheating). 
301 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. 
302 See McMillan & Woodruff, Private Order, supra note 21, at 2440 (noting that “since 
checking on the status of each potential trading partner is a costly activity, traders had to 
be given an incentive not to free ride”). This is not necessarily the case with middlemen 
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 At the time of the survey, few farmers appear to have already estab-
lished long-term relationships with middlemen.303 Only 27% of farmers 
surveyed report selling their entire gardens to repeat buyers and a far 
larger percentage, 68%, report selling their garden to multiple buy-
ers.304 Although they appear willing to make such investments, farmers 
report only a minimal premium on the value of a long-term relation-
ship.305 This value can be ascertained by the size of the premium re-
quired to cause a farmer to switch from one buyer to another. In our 
study, farmers report that they would be willing to leave their current 
middleman and move to a new middleman for an average price in-
crease in the range of only 5–10%.306 It may well be that farmers are 
under pricing the value of relational contracting, particularly if, by en-
tering into complex transactions with middlemen that enable middle-
men to access more valuable markets at greater distance.307 
 Notwithstanding the problem of pricing the value of a relational 
contract, farmers remain faced with the challenge of determining 
whether a stranger seeking a complex transaction is a good risk or a bad 
one. In this context, reputation is not a reliable signal and parties have 
not developed robust relationships. Therefore, to develop relational 
contracting and move beyond spot market transactions, farmers must 
engage in other approaches. 
 Our survey indicates that farmers appear to diversify their sales in 
order to generate information about potential business partners—a 
first step towards relational contracting.308 Diversification is a common 
strategy adopted by farmers around the world to reduce the intensity of 
bad outcomes.309 Farmers can employ diversification strategies to man-
                                                                                                                      
who may be able to use interactions with other middlemen at wholesale markets higher in 
the commodity stream to trade information about farmers. See id. at 2457 (noting that 
competition gives middlemen strong incentives to monitor clients). 
303 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. Given the relatively young life of the pomelo market 
it is not entirely surprising that the survey instrument may have captured a snapshot of a 
market in development. See id. 
304 See id. 
305 See id. 
306 See id. Eighty percent of farmers report that they would switch from one middleman 
to another in order to get the small premium. See id. 
307 See id. 
308 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. 
309 See Boris E. Bravo-Ureta, Horacio Cocchi & Daniel Solís, Output Diversification Among 
Small-Scale Hillside Farmers in El Salvador 1 (OME Office of Evaluation & Oversight, Working 
Paper OVE/WP-17/06, 2006), available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument. 
aspx?docnum=912167 (noting that diverse agricultural strategies are used in less developed 
regions to reduce various risks including pest and disease and lessening price fluctuations). 
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age exogenous risks, like weather or crop disease.310 One of the most 
significant risks that Mekong Delta fruit farmers face is contract default 
in transactions with middlemen.311 Thus, it is not surprising that Viet-
namese farmers would likewise adopt a pattern of diversifying their 
sales to mitigate the risk of contract default. The pattern of diversifica-
tion minimizes the costs of contract default across the farmer’s portfo-
lio of sales and permits farmers to provide credit to strangers in the ab-
sence of strong legal rights or other private ordering mechanisms.312 
 A large majority of farmers, sixty-eight percent, adopt this portfolio 
approach to their sales. In doing so, farmers consciously split their gar-
den into smaller lots and sell each of these lots to multiple buyers— 
strangers as well as those with whom they have extensive relation-
ships.313 Selling in smaller lots, raises costs at the margin for buyers. Ac-
cordingly, this pattern of sales appears to be driven by farmers, not 
                                                                                                                      
310 See Marcel Fafchamps, Food and Agriculture Organization, Rural Poverty, 
Risk and Development 8 (1999) (describing the manner in which rural farmers seek to 
manage their exposure to risk through “portfolio diversification,” including “plant[ing] 
different crops, or several varieties of the same crop to obtain a more stable output”); BBC 
World Serv. & Natural Res. Inst., In the Field, Sustainable Livelihoods: Vulnerability, Complexity 
and Diversification, http://www.nri.org/projects/InTheField/vulnerability.htm (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2010) (explaining that farmers reduce risk by diversifying their crop production, 
sale markets, and income sources). 
311 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. 
312 See S. Timothy Kochis, Wealth Management: A Concise Guide to Financial 
Planning and Investment Management for Wealthy Clients 97 (2007) (summarizing 
the economic principles behind the concept of portfolio diversification). A Vietnamese 
farmer’s approach to its portfolio of contracts with middlemen is rooted in the same eco-
nomic principles governing, for example, an individual investor’s approach to purchasing 
stock. Cf. id. (“[W]ithin any general investment category, such as common stocks or bonds, 
effective diversification will eliminate unsystematic risk.”) The farmer’s portfolio of con-
tracts represents a set of risky assets just as an investor’s portfolio of securities does; in both 
instances diversification decreases the amount of downside risk because underperfor-
mance by one contract or one type of stock is hedged against by the performance of the 
rest of the portfolio of assets, taken as a whole. See id. Consequently, when either a Viet-
namese farmer or a securities investor evaluates whether to include a particular asset in the 
portfolio, the risk of that investment is assessed “in relation to the overall portfolio, not just 
the individual risk in isolation.” See id. In the specific case of Vietnamese farmers conduct-
ing business without relying heavily on relational contracting or other risk-mitigating ap-
proaches, the management of risk through portfolio diversification allows the farmer to 
make ostensibly “riskier” economic decisions (that is, providing credit in speculative sales 
to strangers), which they otherwise might not make without the hedge of a diversified 
portfolio of contracts. See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2; cf. Kochis, supra, at 97 (explaining 
portfolio diversification in terms of stocks and bonds). 
313 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. Predictably, a very small minority of farmers, four 
percent, sell their entire garden to strangers in the fashion described above. See id. 
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middlemen.314 Farmers can maximize the expected value of their sales 
while minimizing the costs of the downside risks of contract default by 
allocating sales among different classes of buyers, including providing 
credit in speculative sales to strangers.315 In that way, the portfolio strat-
egy provides farmers with cheap insurance against default.316 
 Diversification of sales, however, is not an efficient  private order-
ing strategy.317 Even though it may mitigate ex ante the expected costs of 
default, diversification does nothing to alter the ex post incentives in a 
way that might promote self-enforcement by buyers.318 Unlike rela-
tional contracting or reliance on reputation, buyer default does not 
result in the buyer incurring any direct or indirect costs that might oth-
erwise act as a deterrent. Diversification may result in a stable portfolio 
of farmer sales over time but it does not lead to durable individual con-
tracts.319 Consequently, farmers engaging in this type of contracting are 
not likely in an equilibrium position.320 
 While diversification does not lead directly to sustainable contract-
ing, it does create opportunities for farmers to seek out good middle-
                                                                                                                      
314 See id. It is more profitable for middlemen to cut short the collection period and fill 
their boats with the fewest number of purchases possible rather than to accept large num-
bers of small lot purchases. As a result it seems clear that the portfolio approach is driven 
by farmers, not middlemen. See id. 
315 See Kochis, supra note 312, at 97;supra, note 311. 
316 See generally Fafchamps, supra note 310 (describing the manner in which rural 
farmers seek to manage their exposure to risk through “portfolio diversification”); see also 
Williamson, supra note 3, at 485–86 (“Commercial contracting will be better served if par-
ties are cognizant of the embeddedness conditions of which they are a part and recognize, 
mitigate, and price out contractual hazards in a discriminating way.”). Other authors, while 
not as explicit in their support of this economic view of trust, nevertheless embed concepts 
of an implicit calculation in their descriptions of trust. See Hardin, supra note 60, at 11–12; 
Cox, supra note 60, at 263. Trust can be defined as “an action that . . . creates the possibil-
ity of mutual benefit, if the other person is cooperative, and the risk of loss to oneself if the 
other person defects.” Hardin, supra note 60, at 11–12; see Cox, supra note 60, at 263. 
317 See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 21, at 642–43 (suggesting 
that an inability to monitor trading partners leads to a reluctance to sanction the business 
partner, thereby encouraging opportunism and undermining cooperation); McMillan & 
Woodruff, Private Order, supra note 21 at 2423 (stating that private ordering is ‘not feasible’ 
where parties can easily enter and leave the marketplace because alternative trading part-
ners are readily accessible). 
318 See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 155, at 1311–12 (noting that the time-depen-
dent effects of product sales to suppliers parallel those made to customers where concen-
trated sales of one product are subject to greater risks from market fluctuations). 
319 See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 21, at 648–49 (noting that 
where a business partner sells customized products to another, there is a willingness to 
sanction the customer who cheats; notably, however, the effect of such sanctions is not 
significant). 
320 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. 
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men.321 Farmers engaging in diversification of their sales are able to test 
multiple buyers in order to determine which buyers might be good 
long-term business partners.322 By relying on diversification, farmers are 
able to provide credit to a stranger with whom they have previously not 
done business and thereby test the trustworthiness of multiple trading 
partners without bearing the excessive costs associated with default.323 
Dealing with strangers in this way creates opportunities for parties to 
gradually develop long-term relationships with the best trading part-
ners while revealing the unreliable and ceasing to send business their 
way.324 
 Consistent with that tacit strategy, middlemen report that initial 
purchases from farmers tend to be small and increase over time.325 Par-
ticularly, they report placing smaller average orders with farmers with 
whom they have not done previous business. In fact, the average size of 
purchases from initial sellers is only thirty-five percent of the average 
size of purchases from repeat sellers.326 Furthermore, more than ninety 
percent of farmers report that they would not continue to do business 
with a middleman who they felt cheated them.327 
 Taken together with the high turnover of trading partners, this data 
suggests farmers are using diversification strategies to search for reliable 
business partners.328 As a middleman proves his reliability, farmers may 
move more of their business to him. Those who default on their prom-
ises have the prospect of future business taken away.329 
IV. Farmers, Middlemen and the Rule of Law Movement 
 The experience of farmers and middlemen in Vietnam’s Mekong 
Delta helps provide answers to some of the questions raised by the new 
rule of law movement. First, after twenty-five years of pursuing an ag-
                                                                                                                      
321 See id. 
322 See id. 
323 See id. 
324 See Axelrod, supra note 53, at 12–13, 20–21. 
325 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. 
326 See id. 
327 See infra tbl.8, Average Quantities Purchased Over Past Three Years (Tons). 
328 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. 
329 Cf. Axelrod, supra note 55, at 20–21 (describing such a strategy in the context of 
computer simulations). Axelrod found that a “tit-for-tat” strategy beginning with “small 
clusters of individuals” can spread and establish the basis for cooperation across the board. 
Id. Following a tit-for-tat strategy, parties should be quick to extend trust to strangers but 
then punish quickly by withholding future business. See id. Counter-parties who prove 
themselves trustworthy are rewarded by additional cooperation in subsequent rounds. See 
id. 
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gressive legal reform agenda with a focus on the development of legal 
institutions appropriate to a market economy, formal legal rights and 
supporting institutions in Vietnam are still weak.330 In the decade fol-
lowing the work of McMillan and Woodruff, although there has been a 
substantial amount of activity in the legal development area, there has 
not been demonstrable improvement in the perceived quality of formal 
legal institutions and formal legal rights.331 Notwithstanding efforts to 
develop and reform the formal dispute resolution system through the 
courts system or the delineation of formal legal rights through the 
drafting of legislation, market participants in the Mekong Delta have 
little or no expectation that written contracts have sufficient force to 
compel performance and, as a result, do not rely on them.332 Clearly 
after a quarter-century of effort, legal reform and the development of 
formal institutions in Vietnam is still a work in progress. Moreover, the 
work of developing these formal legal institutions is appropriately de-
fined as a long-term effort. Trubek and others correctly suggest that 
given the long-term potential payout, investments in the formal legal 
system have to be long-term and made for their own sake, not with the 
misperception that such investments will result in improved economic 
results in the short or medium term.333 
 Additionally, notwithstanding the lack of effective formal institu-
tions farmers, middlemen, and other economic actors are willing to 
make long-term investments of the type one might not expect were it 
true that formal legal systems are a prerequisite to such activity.334 Farm-
ers, for example, are willing to make long-term investments in fruit trees 
with no assurance that in the out years, middlemen will make good on 
their commitments to purchase fruit.335 For their part, fifty-five percent 
of middlemen appear willing to make long-term investments in capital 
assets namely, their boats. Therefore, if law and formal legal structures 
                                                                                                                      
330 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2; see also Seth Mydans, Rural Ventures in Vietnam Suffer in 
the Global Crisis, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 2009, at A8 (stating that Vietnam’s entrance into the 
World Trade Organization in 2007 was “a step that required revisions of [Vietnam’s] legal 
infrastructure, banking system and regulations that are still causing pain as they reap-
plied”). 
331 See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 21, at 637–38. 
332 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. In a high-trust society like the United States, market 
participants may also forego written contracts when doing business. See Macauley, supra 
note 10, at 58. Though, in such situations parties are able to adopt this informal stance 
because they are, in effect, contracting in the shadow of the law. See id. at 62. 
333 See Trubeck, supra note 4, at 74–76, 93–94; see also Tamanaha, supra note 51, at 484–
85. 
334 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. 
335 See id. 
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were a prerequisite for economic activity and economic growth in a 
post-transition economy, neither the farmer nor the middlemen would 
be expected to make such long-term investments.336 
 Further, in the absence of formal legal rights, market participants 
find ways to structure their interactions in order to raise the probabili-
ties of performance.337 Farmers appear willing to do business with 
strangers.338 This differs from other contexts where outsiders have diffi-
culty establishing the relationships required to enter into commercial 
relationships with insiders.339 Vietnamese fruit farmers demonstrate an 
openness to doing business with strangers that is shared with their ur-
ban cousins in private manufacturing enterprises.340 This farmer risk-
taking is likely part of an implicit strategy to develop relational con-
tracts with middlemen. Farmers, for example, appear to take chances 
on unknown middlemen and provide them with a small amount of 
credit.341 In the event middlemen make good on their promises, farm-
ers continue to do business and increase the size of their subsequent 
contracts.342 Again, this strategy is not dissimilar to contracting strate-
gies undertaken by manufacturing enterprises in urban areas sampled 
by McMillan and Woodruff.343 
 Finally, farmers and middlemen tend not to rely on formal institu-
tions for the resolution of disputes. Instead, parties rely more on direct 
negotiation to resolve disputes or simply write off losses and move 
on.344 Of course, rural market participants are typically more remote 
from formal legal structures than perhaps urban market participants, 
so the fact that they eschew reliance on formal legal structures should 
not be altogether surprising.345 Farmers and middlemen who were the 
                                                                                                                      
336 See id. 
337 See McMillan & Woodruff, Private Order, supra note 21, at 2421–23. 
338 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. 
339 See Landa, supra note 53, at 354–55, 356. 
340 See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 21, at 651. 
341 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. 
342 See id. 
343 See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 21, at 652 (describing, 
through anecdotal accounts, the process by which new trading partners become accustomed 
to one another and expand their trading relationships and noting that “[e]xperience in deal-
ing with a trading partner substitutes for preexisting . . . connections.”). 
344 See infra tbl.5, Dispute Resolution Methods (Farmers); infra tbl.6, Dispute Resolution Meth-
ods (Middlemen). 
345 See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 21, at 644; see also United 
Nations Dev. Programme, supra note 135, at 7, 9, 11, 15 (noting the discrepancy between 
urban and rural areas in Vietnam with respect to awareness of judicial institutions, aware-
ness of legal reforms, access to judicial institutions, and, most tellingly, confidence in judi-
cial institutions). 
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focus of the survey here are not, however, dissimilar to other economic 
actors who show a willingness to make long-term investments despite 
the weakness of formal legal institutions.346 
 If one examines Vietnam’s external relationships, for instance, one 
finds a similar pattern of risk taking in the presence of weak legal sys-
tems—precisely the type that should theoretically be foresworn by in-
adequate legal structures.347 In the area of foreign trade, Vietnam has 
enjoyed rapid growth in trade relations over the past decade notwith-
standing predictions that weak formal legal structures would inhibit 
such growth.348 Though Vietnam and the United States have only re-
cently adopted their bilateral investment agreement, the benefits for 
Vietnam of this market-opening treaty are obvious.349 Trade with the 
United States has grown rapidly since 2000.350 This growth, however, is 
likely a consequence of the market opening features of the treaty rather 
than the treaty’s indirect effect on the development of Vietnam’s for-
mal legal system.351 
                                                                                                                      
346 See Quinn & Vu, supra note 2. 
347 See Int’l Bus. Publ’ns, USA, Vietnam: Financial and Trade Policy Handbook 
149 (4th ed. 2008) (describing the legal difficulties associated with the development of a 
more market-oriented economy in Vietnam, which include confusion among officials im-
plementing the laws, varying interpretations, shortages of lawyers, law-graduate judges, 
and law professors, and inadequate dissemination of information about the laws); Lisa 
Toohey, Stepping Stones and Stumbling Blocks: Vietnam’s Regional Trade Arrangements and WTO 
Accession, in Challenges to Multilateral Trade: The Impact of Bilateral, Preferen-
tial and Regional Agreements 65, 73–74 (Ross Buckley et al. eds., 2008) (detailing 
Vietnam’s intense desire to integrate into the global trading system, as evidenced by its 
pursuit of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements as well as its accession to the WTO in 
2006, and revealing that Vietnam is still understood to be transitioning toward the rule of 
law); see also Dixit, supra note 64, at 3 (“Of course economic activity does not grind to a 
halt because the government cannot or does not provide an adequate underpinning of 
law. Too much potential value would go unrealized . . . .”). 
348 Compare McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 21, at 639–40 (con-
tending that despite the obstacles Vietnam faces as a transition economy, a thriving private 
sector has emerged), with Dixit, supra note 64, at 65–67, 80–84 (suggesting that in the 
absence of strong legal rights there should be a negative relationship between geographic 
distance and the amount of trade). 
349 See Agreement between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam on Trade Relations, supra note 96. 
350 See Trade, Price and Tourism, 2008 Stat. Y.B. Vietnam, supra note 76, at 452 (statistics 
on exports from Vietnam to the United States demonstrate a steady upward trend since 
2000). 
351See Data Dissemination Branch, U.S. Census Bureau, Trade with Vietnam: 2001, April 13, 
2010, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5520.html#2001 (statistics on Vietnam-
ese imports into the United States show a sharp increase from 2000 to 2008); Trade, Price and 
Tourism, supra note 349, at 452. 
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 Foreign direct investment in Vietnam is an area where one finds a 
similar willingness to make long-term commitments, regardless of the 
lack of adequate formal legal protections. Foreign direct investment is 
highly illiquid, and unlike trade, investors need to be willing to stay in 
place for the long-term.352 Were formal legal structures and formal le-
gal rights a precondition for foreign direct investment, then one would 
expect Vietnam to exhibit low levels of investment. Yet, in fact, during 
the period following doi moi, Vietnam has enjoyed very high levels of 
foreign direct investment.353 This suggests that foreign investors—who 
are likely to be more “legally oriented” than Mekong Delta farmers— 
are not dissuaded from making long-term investments in the absence 
of strong legal rights and durable formal legal institutions.354 
 All of this demonstrates that formal legal institutions and formal 
legal rights are a trailing edge rather than a leading edge issue. In tran-
sition, economic actors will find ways to structure transactions to assure 
performance rather than wait for governmental authorities to establish 
perfect conditions in which to contract. That is not to say that rule of 
law activities are not useful, but rather, that they are not an imperative 
prerequisite for growth in a transition economy and market actors will 
not idly await them.355 Thus, such activities are trailing edge. In their 
absence, parties appear to find ways to rely on private ordering strate-
gies or second-best institutions.356 David Trubek and Alvaro Santos simi-
larly note that rule of law activities are of ambiguous value in the near 
                                                                                                                      
352 See World Bank, supra note 3, at 63–65; see also Trubek, supra note 4, at 82–84. 
353 See World Bank, supra note 3, at 21; Investment, supra 189, at 103 (statistics demon-
strate a high rate of foreign direct investments in Vietnam). The demonstrable drop off in 
foreign investment during the period starting in 1997 corresponds with the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997–1998. See Vikas Bajaj & Keith Bradsher, Asia Sails Smoothly Through Debt Waters, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2010, at B1; Shawn W. Crispin, Vietnam as Asia’s First Domino, Asia Times, 
Feb. 10, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/LB10Ae01.html. 
354 See Legal Vice Presidency, supra note 3, at 21, 63–65; Investment, supra note 189, at 
103; fig. 3, Registered Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam (1988–2007); see also Donald C. 
Clarke, What Kind of Legal System Is Necessary for Economic Development?: The China Puzzle, in 
Law Reform in Developing and Transitional States 65, 65–67, 75–77 (Tim Lindsey 
ed., 2007). For example, Intel invested $1 billion in the world’s largest semiconductor 
plant in Vietnam. See Margie Mason, Intel to Invest $1 Billion in Vietnam as Country Strives to 
Raise High-Tech Profile, USA Today, Nov. 18, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/ 
2006-11-18-vietnam_x.htm. The experience of Vietnam is similar to China. See World Bank, 
supra note 3, at 70–71. Notwithstanding the weakness of formal legal structures, China has 
been able to both attract foreign direct investment and achieve sustained economic 
growth. See Clarke, supra, at 65–67, 75–77 (discussing China’s economic success in the face 
of a weak legal regime). 
355 See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 21, at 639–40 (describing 
how despite legal and economic obstacles, Vietnam’s private sector is “thriving”). 
356 See McMillan & Woodruff, Private Order, supra note 21, at 2421–24. 
2010] Farmers, Middlemen, and the New Rule of Law Movement 323 
term.357 They suggest that proponents of such activities should pursue 
them for their own sake and not because they necessarily result in more 
economic development or the medium-term development of democ-
ratic institutions.358 
 Nonetheless, it may well be true that the lack of formal legal rights 
places an upward bound on economic development activity. Such a 
conclusion is truly an attractive justification for reliance on formal legal 
institutions. Such a statement is, however, likely as true as the efficient 
markets hypothesis has turned out to be in economics and finance.359 
Conclusion 
 The new law and development movement’s suggests that in the 
absence of strong formal legal rights, participants should find it diffi-
cult to engage in complex transactions. We, however, find that partici-
pants in the pomelos market in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta carry out rela-
tively complex transactions by granting buyers credit with little explicit 
reliance on formal legal structures.360 Farmers appear to rely on novel 
private ordering structures—a portfolio approach—to generate infor-
mation about potentially reliable partners.361 As new buyers prove 
themselves reliable partners, farmers may shift more business to them, 
migrating gradually towards more relational contracting to support 
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complex transactions as parties search for and find reliable partners.362 
This snapshot of the fruit markets in the Mekong Delta suggests that 
first, in spite of the lack strong legal rights, parties are able to engage in 
complex transactions, and second, that developing formal legal struc-
tures is a complicated and long-term process with uncertain results. 
 These conclusions are important given the continuing debate over 
the importance of the formal legal system in creating conditions con-
ducive to economic development. Throughout the 1990s and until 
now, general components of the World Bank’s Washington Consensus 
include market liberalization and strengthening of the rule of law to 
support the development of markets.363 Critics of the Washington Con-
sensus approach to rule of law reforms criticize its narrow focus on for-
mal legal institutions in the form of legal transplantation and legal 
education as ineffective and a throw-back to the failed law and devel-
opment movement of the 1960s and 1970s.364 While this Article does 
not intend to resolve the debate over the efficacy of this new rule of law 
movement, it does question whether strong legal rights engendered in 
the formal legal institutions favored by this approach are a prerequisite 
for parties to engage in welfare-enhancing economic activity.365 Indeed, 
rather than being a prerequisite, the experience of farmers and mid-
dlemen in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta suggests that the creation of strong 
legal rights of the type endorsed by the new rule of law movement are a 
trailing edge reform rather than a leading edge one. In the absence of 
strong legal rights, market participants are able to adapt and find sec-
ond-best solutions. 
 The new rule of law movement stands to make the same mistakes 
of the law and development movement of the 1960s and 1970s to the 
extent that it focuses on developing formal legal structures, legislative 
transplantation, and legal training. In the Mekong Delta, farmers might 
be better off if time and energy was spent investing in improving the 
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efficiency of information flows about potential counterparties than in 
building up formal legal rights. Indeed, bottom-up approaches can re-
inforce the work of private actors and possibly help develop appropri-
ate indigenous institutions over time. By treating the development of 
legal institutions to support markets as a mere top-down technical 
problem that can generate generalized trust in a market economy, the 
new rule of law movement may ultimately fail to be of consequence. 
 Those who eschew an instrumentalist view on the role of law in the 
development process and argue the rule of law project is a long term, 
even decades long, effort with unlikely outcomes are more likely to be 
correct. The rule of law rather than a precursor to economic growth 
and development in transition economies is likely to be a result over 
time. Such a process is almost entirely endogenous—developed from 
the ground up by farmers, middlemen, and other economic actors over 
time. Moreover, the process is one in which the role of outsiders may be 
of little consequence, diminishing their status from that of prime 
mover to that of attentive observer. 
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Tables 
 Table 1: Middlemen Delayed Payment Terms 
Immediate settlement 68% 
Pay 3-4 days after receipt 10.4% 
Pay 5-15 days after receipt 8.3% 
Pay 1-2 months after receipt 3.3% 
Pay in installments over three month period 5.5% 
Other 4.2% 
 
 Table 2: Middlemen Approaches to Farmers 
No. of Approaches % of Farmers % Farmers willing to grant credit 
0 3.4% 0.0% 
1 3.4% 1.2% 
2 5.1% 1.8% 
3 11.4% 4.8% 
4 12.5% 4.2% 
5 13.1% 5.4% 
6-10 32.4% 8.9% 
11-20 13.6% 4.8% 
>20 5.1% 1.8% 
 
 Table 3: Middlemen Problems with Farmers 
Farmer sells to other buyer 50.0% 
Price problems (renegotiation)  18.8% 
Poor quality fruit 18.8% 
Other  12.5% 
 
 Table 4: Farmer Problems with Middlemen 
Middleman failed to pay 43.4% 
Disagreements over quality 16.6% 
Pricing Problems 11.1% 
Other 16.6% 
 
 Table 5: Dispute Resolution Methods (Farmers) 
Forget it and move on 44.4% 
Negotiate with middleman 27.8% 
Go to court, local government, police 22.2% 
Other 5.6% 
 
 Table 6: Dispute Resolution Methods (Middlemen) 
Forget it and move on 16.3% 
Negotiate with farmer 41.9% 
Go to police, court, local gov't. 41.9% 
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 Table 7: What Information Do You Get from Local Organizations? 
Extension services 66.7% 
Credit 9.5% 
Market information 11.9% 
Dispute resolution 11.9% 
 
 Table 8: Average Quantities Purchased Over Past Three Years (tons) 
Seller 2004 2005 2006* 
Repeat seller 104.93 113.53 79.05 
First time seller 45.21 41/67 16.00 
Other 15.00 10.00 5.00 
 * Through June of 2006. 
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